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This thesis focuses on the leadership, both internal and external, of the Palestinian
people in the occupied territories of Israel, in an effort to determine if any internal political
groups exist that are capable of challenging the authcrtv of the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO). Background information includes the rise of Palestinian nationalism
and &he history of politics in the West Bank and Gaza Strip since the 1967 War. The
primary factor influencing the current leadership transformations is the Palestinian uprising
or intifada, that began in December of 1987 and continues today. The internal leadership of
the uprising, including the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), the
Islamic fundamentalist groups, and the traditional notables, are all considered as possible
challenges to the PLO's leadership. The external PLO leadership, its primary left wing
components and their relationship to the intifada, are also presented.
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1. BACKGROUND
After the 1967 War, Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip added some
1.7 million Palestinians to its population. The West Bank, Gaza Strip and Sinai peninsula
were all to be used as bargaining chips in a "land for peace" negotiated settlement. In
1978, with the signing of the Camp David Accords, the Sinai was returned to Egypt and
the West Bank and Gaza were to be administered under a five year autonomy program.
Thte later part of the treaty was never implemented by Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem
Begin who as a revisionist, supported the Jabotinsky idea of a "Greater Israel" in all of
historic Palestine. Lacking Palestinian support, the general consensus considering
autonomy another word for continued Israeli control, the Camp David Accords' intentions
for the occupied territories failed to provide a viable solution.
Although Israel actively engaged in secret dialogue with Jordan's King Hussein from
1967 until 19771 in an attempt to resolve the Palestinian problem, it was not until after
Camp David that King Hussein became the primary focus of Israeli and eventually U.S.
attempts at peace. Jordan was to participate in the process of implementing the Camp
David agreement however, like the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the rest
of the Arab world, Jordan rejected the autonomy solution. Despite this, the King was
considered a reasonable negotiating partner with whom Israel could work in finding a
viable solution for peace. Like Israel, Jordan also had an interest in preventing the
establishment of an independent Palestinian state and containing PLO influence and terrorist
activity.
I Aaron S. Klieman, Israel and the World After 40 Years, (New York, NY: Pergamon-Brassey
International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1990), p. 224.
The reemergence of the Palestinian nationalist movement, the rise of the PLO as the
legitimate representative of the Palestinians and the subsequent decline of Jordanian
popularity in the territories, ended the solely Jordanian option and brought to the fore, the
Jordanian-Palestinian option. The PLO however, was not considered a party to possible
negotiations. Jordan, therefore, acted as interlocutor between the PLO and Israel, as each
refused to recognize the legitimacy of the other. The terrorist activities of the PLO ensured
Israel would not consider the organization's leader, Yasir Arafat, a party to negotiations.
"...whenever it appeared as though the public mood in Israel might become more receptive
to considering eithcer th, wisdom or the practicality of sitting down and talking directly with
the Palestinians, some timely act of violence by Fatah or any of the other PLO factions
silenced voices for change, poisoning the atmosphere for months and years to come.' 2
The terrorist activities of the PLO have only served to cement the Israeli-Jordanian
relationship and further alienate Israel from the PLO. After the 1974 Rabat conference,
where the PLO was proclaimed the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people
by the Arab world, it became blatantly obvious that Jordan could not act unilaterally on
behalf of the Palestinians. King Hussein neither had the legitimate authority nor the
popular support to negotiate terms of peace. This new development forced Hussein to
"...approach his relations with Israel in the narrowest terms of self-preservation.. .his
penchant for fence-sitting - however understandable on his part, translated into Israeli
indecision and paralysis on the most vital issue of bringing the Arab-Israeli conflict to an
end diplomatically." 3
A resolution to the conflict appeared to be near in 1985 when Hussein and Arafat
entered into a joint Jordanian-Palestinian agreement for negotiating peace. The accord
2 Klieman, p. 221.
3 Klieman, p. 230.
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affirmed the principle of exchanging territory for peace and called for settling the
Palestinian problem in accordance with UN security council resolutions under an
international forum, to include the Soviet Union and other permanent members of the UN
Security Council. 4 Despite the "implicit" recognition of Israel by Arafat, Foreign Minister
Shamir dismissed the pact, stating Israel would agree to a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation
but not a Jordanian-PLO one. Asher Susser, an expert on the i-LO and Jordan, considered
the pact in pragmatic terms:
Hussein needs Arafat for legitimation. Arafat needs Hussein for access into the peace
process. 5
Susser, when confronted by Israeli statements that ignoring the pact might help to further
weaken Arafat, replied:
You can stand on your head and dance a jig, but the fact is Arafat is still Mr.
Palestine. He is still the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and he is
still a factor to be reckoned with. 6
In a not uncommon difference of opinion between Israel's two major political parties,
Labor and Likud, under the second National Unity Government, Prime Minister Shimon
Peres took a slightly different position from Shamir on the Accords. Peres welcomed the
talks but also refused to deal directly with the PLO, instead recommending Arafat appoint
moderate Palestiniar, figures who were not "known" members of the PLO, to represent the
Palestinian side. 7 Despite his claims that Israel was ready to take "bold steps" towards
4 Thomas L. Friedman, "Shamir Calls Jordan-PLO Pact in Not Way an 'Opening to Peace,"' in The New
York Times, (February 25, 1985), p. Al.
5 Friedman, p. A4.
6 Friedman, p. A4.
7 Thomas L. Friedman, "Peres Cautiously Welcomes Call for Direct Mideast Talks," in The New York
Times, (February 26, 1985), p. AI0.
peace, Peres also balked at the idea of an international conference. On a visit to
Washington to discuss the peace plan with President Reagan, Peres failed to mention the
role of the PLO in negotiations. 'With our hand of peace extended across the Jordanian
River, we call upon our eastern neighbor to heed and accept this sincere invitation. '"
Such rhetoric exemplifies the strong Israeli attachment to Jordan and total faith in the
Jordanian option as the sole path to peace, despite eighteen years of failure. It also
demonstrates Israel's naivete in believing that King Hussein held enough popular support
to proceed without the PLC).
One year later, the Hussein-Arafat accord was aband-ned with the King calling the
PLO "untrustworthy" and declaring:
We do not want to deal with the PLO anymore.. .The PLO leadership has proved that
its priorities are not identical with our priorities or with those of the Palestinian
people.9
Arafat's (and the PLO's) refusal to accept any limitations on the PLO appointments of a
delegation and failure to expressly accept UN resolution 242, (which calls for a peaceful
solution to the conflict and requires recognition of Israel's right to exist within secure and
recognized boarders), and renounce terrorism, caused the collapse of the pact. Even if the
pact had survived however, it is highly unlikely the PLO would have ever been accepted by
Israel as a partner to peace. The land for peace option, the Jordanian-Palestinian goal of the
talks, would probably have been defeated by me lsraeii govein-tent who nc c ) : balance
the Labor party's acceptance of land for peace with the Likud party's desire to retain control
over the territories.
8 Bernard Weinraub, "Israel Extends 'Hand of Peace' to Jordanians," in The New York Times, (October
18, 1985), p. 10.
9
"Hussein Drops a Yearlong Effort to Join in Peace Bid with Aratat," in The New York Times,
(February 20, 1986), p. A4.
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'"_, the break in Jordanian-PLO relations, King Hussein unsuccessfully attempted to
muster Palestinian support for Jordanian representation. Despite economic dependance on
Jordan, Palestinian loyalties lay with Arafat. "The majority of younger Palestinians
support the PLO and suspect King Hussein of trying to destroy Mr. Arafat, the only
symbol of self-determination and national rights they have ever known." ' '0 This last ditch
effort proved to Hussein and Israel that Jordan could not stand alone in representing the
people of the occupied territories. Despite the view by many Palestinians that a joint PLO-
Jordanian effort was the only solution and the disappointment expressed at the failure of the
joint pact, their support for the PLO 'as unshaken. Even after such a showing of loyalty.
Israel continued to "wear blinders" in refusing to purge the Jordanian option from its
politics.
In 1988, King Hussein forma!lly renounced any claims to the West Bank or the right to
represent it. He also announced the end of his assistance in administering the West Bank.
paying salaries of West Bank public employees and allowing West Bankers to sit on the
Jordanian Parliament. Hussein's decision sent shock waves through the Israeli
government who had relied on Jordan for so long without consideration for contingency
planning on an alternative peace pai-tner. "Despite the clear demise of Jordan's influence on
the West Bank, the Israeli Labor party mortgaged its future almost entirely to the Jordanian
option, in its desperate attempt to find an interlocutor - any interlocutor - to take over the
management of the West Bank." 1 I Even though the Jordanian option had been slipping
away during the 1970's and 80's, with Hussein's hands becoming increasingly tied by his
]')Judith Miller, "Palestinians in Occupied Regions Stunned by Hussein-Arafat Break," in The New
YQrk Timi. (March 3, 1986), p. A3.
11Graham E. Fuller, The West Bank of Israel: Point of No Return? (Santa Monicq, CA: Rand
Corporation. 1989, p. 26.
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lack of legitimacy in the occupied territories, Israel and the Labor party in particular.
continued to consider Jordan as the only true representative of the West Bank Palestinians.
Israel's tunnel vision on the endorsement of the Jordanian option prevented the
development of any new initiatives on peace. Even after Hussein's speech, Israel
continued to believe the option still existed. The implications of losing Jordan as a
negotiating partner included the possibility of losing the option for Jordan to "take back"
t;,, West Bank. The two state solution or outright annexation would be the only
alternatives.
The rise of the intifada and its mass outbursts of violence, made the West Bank an
uncertain prize. Incorporating such radical elements into Jordan's population would only
cause political instability and present a possible challenge to the Jordanian monarchy. King
Hussein realized it was time to step aside and give the PLO an opportunity to work out a
solution to the conflict. Hussein's withdrawal may have been "...an effort to throw the
enr;re problem into Arafat's lap to let him see if he can do any better by the West Bank
Palestinians than Jordan did." 12 Regardless of Hussein's motivations for withdrawal from
the peace process, the implications are far reaching. The King's decision removed the
Jordanian connection with the West Bank residents, further institutionalizing their sense of
self-reliance and separateness as an independent people, The King's move also further
legitimized Arafat's position as the leader of the Palestinians. There could now be no
question as to who legitimately represented the Palestinian people.
The Israeli-Arab failure to resolve the West Bank problem in the few years
immediately following the 1967 war, resulted in missing a prime opportunity for peace.
The chance for a peaceful solution in coordination with Jordan slowly ebbed away as
Jordanian supporters in the West Bank we.e replaced by PLO supporters. By the mid
12 Fuller, p. 28.
6
1970's it was difficult to find anyone in the West Bank who supported a return to
Jordanian control. Self-determination and an independent Palestinian state became the
watchwords of the Palestinian nationalist movement. During this changing era however,
both the U.S. and Israel failed to see the decline of Jordan as a viable partner in negotiating
peace. An entire generation has past since Jordan controlled the West Bank and few now
feel any connection with the East Bank world. As previously mentioned, Jordan's decision
to bow out of future negotiations on the West Bank will have many consequences.
According to Graham Fuller, one might be the hastening of the establishment of an
independent Palestinian state.
In the end, Jordan's step in cutting the umbilical cord will probably hasten the
creation of an independent West Bank administration and encourage the establishment
of further nascent state institutions. But the transition process is likely to be painful
and violent. 13
With the Jordanian option gone, Israel has attempted to find an alternative leadership to
the PLO in the territories with whom to make peace. With the conservative Likud party
firmly in power however, it is difficult to say how sincere such efforts have been. The
continuation of the intifada after almost three years of violence, has created international
pressure on Israel to put an end to the uprising and find a final solution to a conflict that has
raged for far too long. As the peace process fails to move forward, the political mood of
the Palestinians in the territories may be changing for the worse. The people of the
territories are growing restless and an increase in settlement activity has fueled suspicions
that Israel indeed intends to annex all of Palestine. The PLO's 1988 decision to accept UN
resolutions 242 and 338 and renounce terrorism was met with praise and excitement from
territory residents. The intifada had ripened the atmosphere for conciliation. Almost two
13 Fuller, p. 30.
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years later, the establishment of a Palestinian state and the framework for a just and lasting
peace are nowhere in sight. Israel still refuses to talk to Arafat and the intifada, with its
emotional and financial hardships, continues. While the more radical splinters of the PLO
have managed to remain united (not an easy feat), and the PLO still appears to have control
over the activities of the intifada, what will happen in the future remains to be seen.
The intifada appears to be a movement that began independent from the PLO and that
has created a new internal leadership responsible for coordinating and directing the
activities of the uprising. Whether the internal leadership controls the external PLO or vice
versa is a subject open for debate. In his book Palestine and Israel: the Uprising and
B.yond, David McDowall claims the PLO is more conciliatory than the internal controlling
body of the intifada, the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) and that in
fact the UNLU has put constraints on the actions of the PLO. "There were now [after the
start of the intifada] clearer limitations to what the PLO could do without provoking open
protest from its constituents in the occupied territories."' 14 McDowall did not question
Palestinian support for the PLO, but rather considered the differences a matter of "style."
In their book, Insidthe PLO, Neil Livingstone and David Halevy claim the physical
and psychological distances between the internal leaders of the intifada and the PLO has
created a gap that may be difficult if not impossible to bridge. The young population in the
territories, (70% of the population is under 25 years of age), has no first hand knowledge
of the PLO's leadership or of life before the occupation. The difficulty the young leaders
of the intifada have in identifying with the shadowy leadership of the PLO, the authors
claim, has resulted in a loss of prestige and power for the PLO and in time, may lead to
Arafat's total decline. "In the final analysis, the Intifada may have simultaneously breathed
14David McDowall, Palestine and Israel: the Uprising and Beyond, (London, U.K.: I.B. Tauris and Co.,
1989), p. 121.
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new life into the PLO and accelerated its decline by capitulating a new generation of
Palestinians - with different aspirations, experiences, and values - into the forefront of the
struggle for Palestinian respect and self-determination." 1 5
Understanding the internal leadership of the West Bank and Gaza, the external PLO
leadership, and the relationship between the two will provide an insight into the future
potential for peace. Knowing the players and their political agenda will help uncover who
presently represents the Palestinians of the occupied territories and who is gaining power
among the various groups. With the loss of the Jordanian option, it is imperative to
understand the Palestinian leadership, both external and internal and their political
ideologies in order to understand who will eventually represent the Palestinian people in
future peace negotiations. The primary focus of this thesis is to investigate the past
leadership of the occupied territories and the new leadership that has emerged to control the
intifada, in an effort to determine if the possibility exists for the establishment of an
indigenous leadership outside of the PLO and if so, what the political agenda of such a
leadership might be.
15David Halevy and Neil C. Livingstone, Inside the PLO, (New York, N.Y.: William Morrow and
Company, Inc., 1990), p. 292.
9
I. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
A. THE RISE OF PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM
The origins of Palestinian nationalism and when exactly, the movement began, is a
subject open for debate. Dr. John Amos draws a connection between Palestinian
nationalism and the growth of the Palestinian resistance movement claiming: "...the
organizational, ideological, and emotional roots of the resistance antedate the '67 war by
anywhere from 20 to 40 years." 16 Author Don Peretz asserts that Palestinian-Arab
nationalism emerged by the early 1920's as an offshoot of the greater Arab nationalism
movement in response to British control and the rising popularity and strength of
Zionism. 17 Dr. W.F. Abboushi, visiting professor at Birzeit University, West Bank,
from 1977-79, claims that because Palestine was a purely British creation, few occupants
of the mandate territory considered themselves Palestinians. Palestinian nationalism,
therefore, did not exist during the mandate period nor did it exist after the U.N. partition
plan was enacted in 1948. Abboushi attributes the rise of Palestinian nationalism to the
Arab world's inability to restore Arab rights in Palestine by force and a pervasive feeling of
rejection by fellow Arabs. "What made the Palestinians opt for a nationalism of their own
16John W. Amos III, Palestinian Resistance: Organization of a Nationalist Movement, (New York,
N.Y.: Pergamon Press, 1980), p. 18.
17Don Peretz, The West Bank: History. Politics. Society. and Economy, (Boulder, CO.: Westview
Prcss, 1986) p. 41.
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was... the feeling that Arab nationalism was not strong enough to deter Arab regimes from
mistreating Palestinians."18
Many Israelis feel Palestinian nationalism has no legitimacy because it never existed
prior to the birth of Zionism. 19 %ich an argument however, carries little weight with
Palestinians who passionately believe in the existence of a unified people fighting for a
common goal; freedom from occupation. Nationalism exists in the beliefs, ideologies and
politics of the Palestinian people and cannot therefore be denied by those who fail to
comprehend its meaning. However, as Dr. Amos explained, Israel's acceptance of the
existence of a Palestinian national identity would affect the legitimacy of Israel's historical
claim to Palestine. 20
1. Contributing Factors
Beginning in the late 19th century, the large influx of Jewish immigrants into
Palestine helped fuel nationalistic feelings. Common Zionist phrases such as "the land
without people waiting for the people without land," inspired a growing anger against the
western imperialism that once again sought to upset the status quo of the Middle East.
Despite strong protests from the Arab world, the Balfour declaration set the stage for Arab-
Jewish relations for years to come. The end of the British mandate and the establishment
of the state of Israel further incited the ire of the local Arab population whose position had
been ignored in the decision making process. The end result was the first Arab-Israeli war
and the expulsion of thousands of Arabs from their homes and land. The indigenous Arab
18W. F. Abboushi, "Changing Political Attitudes in the West Bank After Camp David," in A
Palestinian Agenda for the West Bank, ed. Emile A. Nakhleh, (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980), p. 11.
19 Kathleen M. Christison, "Myths About Palestinians," in Foreign Policy, (Spring, 1987), p. 110.
20 Amos, p. 17.
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population of Palestine was dispersed into tbh Jordan controlled West Bank, the Gaza Strip
administered under Egyptian tutelage, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait and any other Middle
Eastern countries that would accept them. Despite the sympathy much of the Arab world
expressed for the displaced persons of Palestine (although the sting of losing to the Israelis
may have over shadowed such feelings somewhat), they were not readily accepted or
welcomed into other countries and were often subjected to discrimination and treated as
outsiders. "At best, the Palestinians are everywhere considered emigres, stateless persons,
with whom it is possible to sympathize, but most often as one sympathizes with
intruders." 21
Deprived of their land and communal relations and forced to live as the minority
population, often among hostile people, the displaced Palestinians lacked political power
and social identification. The educated Palestinians were better able to assimilate into other
Arab worlds because of their acceptance into the skilled labor market. The peasant and
worker classes however, were less fortunate. Often forced to live in refugee camps, where
there was little hope of economic or educational advancement, many Palestinians felt
socially and politically powerless. The overcrowding and substandard living conditions
that symbolized the refugee camp, helped create a rebellious faction of young terrorists.
The Palestinian people would never forget where they came from and how they had been
driven from their land by a foreign people. The stories were to be passed from generation
to generation, becoming more dramatic with each telling. The first settlers of the camps
had their memories of the past in Palestine, but their children often only knew life in the
refugee camps. Lack of personal experience however, did not prevent the younger
generations from missing what they had never known. Understanding the past only
2 1Eric Roulew, "The Palestinians Quest," in Foreign Affairs, (January, 1975), p. 268.
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energized their fighting spirit and desire to avenge what their parents had been forced to
accept. Rosemary Sayigh in her research and interviews with camp Palestinians, expressed
the "paradise lost" feelings of the refugees: "...peasant life [was] good, for, in spite of
poverty, our land provided us with all our needs." 22 Regardless of how close reality
mirrors memory, what existed in the hearts and thoughts of the Palestinians, existed in their
own reality and was to be passed on to their youth. The passion of the youth to right the
wrong done to their parents, helped fuel the nationalist movement and the growing feelings
that the Palestinian people must unite and respond to the injustices of their world.
To rebel against forces that have destroyed the traditional social order to which
one has become accustomed, is a natural reaction. To expect a people to collectively forget
their roots, deny their heritage, their societal structure and affiliations and start anew is
quite unrealistic. The Palestinian people initially put their faith in the Arab world and many
joined Arab nationalist political movements and organizations opposing the status quo, in
hope that a viable solution could be found for the Palestinian dilemma within the structure
of organized political groups. Lack of action and the day to day realities of living in
refugee camps quickly soured the impatient Palestinians. "[Tlhe humiliation of being
refugees, economic exploitation, but most of all the absence of concrete signs of progress
towards liberation - combined to create a revolutionary readiness among Palestinians in the
ghourba which only required a spark to set off."23
In the 1950's three distinct attitudes towards affiliation with political movements
developed among camp Palestinians. The older generation distrusted new political parties
and therefore continued to offer their loyalties to old village leaders, or mukthar, despite the
22Rosemary Sayigh, Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries, (London, UK: Zed Press, 1979),
p. 10 .
2 3 Sayigh, p. 148.
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fact that quite often, the old leaders were living no where near. The second group
consisted uf the idealistic youths who believed in the power of the opposition movements
to change the status quo. They often blindly aligned themselves with dissident
organizations who supported the liberation of Palestine, failing to consider the group's
primary political agenda or methods of achieving its political goals. As one youth
expressed: "We would have joined the Devil's party if it had put Palestine among its
aims.' 24 The third group was a small minority who did not consider any of the existing
groups to have the Palestinian answer. Instead they sought to establish a new Palestinian
political movement. 25
Prior to the '67 war, Nasserism and the cry for Arab unity was an indication to the
Palestinian people that salvation was not far away. The formation of the Palestinian
Liberation Organization in May of 1964 gave the Palestinians a force of their own with
which to identify. The connection was however, quite weak as the majority of the
Palestinian people continued to believe the solution to their problem (ie. eventual liberation)
existed in a strong and united Arab world. Nasser's charismatic personality and
revolutionary rhetoric, inspired the Arab people to believe the destruction of Israel and the
return of the Palestinians in diaspora to their land, was a very real possibility. His slogan
of "unity, liberation and revenge"26 created a euphoria verging on hysteria that could not
easily be controlled or dampened. The virtual destruction of Egypt's airforce on the ground
by a preemptive Israeli attack in 1967, ended the Nasser legacy and almost completely
destroyed Palestinian hopes for an Arab solution.
24 Sayigh, p. 149.
2 5Three divisions of Palestinian thought adapted from Sayigh, p. 149.
26 Peretz, p. 40.
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The June War in 1967 was the second major upheaval for the Palestinian people
and can be identified as a crucial dividing point in the tenor of the Palestinian nationalist
movement. The subsequent occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip upset the tenuous
balance of the political and social structures of the Palestinian occupants. One author rather
dramatically described the havoc wrought by the Six-Day War:
With the June War, all previous modes of life were shattered. The whole social
structure was challenged. All previous values and convictions were put to the
test ...The organization of the society, the values, the ideals were all upset.27
The number of refugees after the 1967 war increased as many fled the West Bank
and Gaza, refusing to live under Israeli occupation. Other Palestinians were left homeless
as Israeli soldiers razed their villages for "strategic" reasons. In a letter to Prime Minister
Levi Eshkol and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, Amos Kenan, an Israeli writer who
witnessed the destruction of several villages, provided a detailed account.
Not one of us could understand how Jews could do such a thing...The fields laid
waste before our very eyes. And the children straggling along the roads wailing and
crying bitter tears will be the fedayeen of the next round in another nineteen
years .... 28
Such a statement proved to be more true than the author and his readers probably realized at
the time.
In the refugee camps, now even more overcrowded from the large influx of
homeless resulting from the war, refugees were seething with anger and ready for revenge.
In a late 1960's in his study of the Jalazun Refugee camp near Ramallah in the West Bank,
Shimon Shamir found a feeling of social inferiority, due to the lack of land ownership, a
27Mark Heller, "Politics and Social Change in the West Bank Since 1967," in Palestinian Society and
Politics, ed. Joel Migdal, (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 197.
28Rafik Halabi, The West Bank Story, translated from Hebrew by Ina Friedman, (New York, N.Y.:
Harcourt Brace Javanovich, Inc., 1982), p. 53-54.
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growing identity crisis, fueled by a transformation from an agricultural society to an
urbanized work force, and a feeling of detachment from the political world. "Many
refugees complained that what they lacked most in their present conditions was istiqrar - an
untranslatable Arabic term that denotes a settled position and a state of stability, security,
and peace of mind.' 29
The sense of "uprooting" from a more traditional agrarian society with its
accompanying loss of an established social structure, was particularly profound. Many of
the community leaders had the economic means to relocate to other countries and therefore
did not foliow ih,,ir people to the refugee camps. Loss of structure created a loss of identity
as all familiar symbols of "home" had vanished. Within the growing Palestinian nationalist
movement, the refugees found an identity and a symbol of pride. "For the refugees,
particularly the educated, their being is an existential assertion of the Palestinian identity."
30
The fedayeen and their anti-Israeli activities were an expression of Palestinian
dignity and pride. The organization was doing something to retaliate for the pain and
suffering inflicted on the Palestinian people. Regardless of personal feelings towards the
tactics and political agenda of the fedayeen, most Palestinians identified with the
organization and that of al-Fatah in particular, who emerged as a popular, powerful force
after the 1967 War and gained further legitimacy in 1969 after taking over the PLO.
Arafat's PLO was a grass roots organization capable of representing the Palestinian identity
and politics and rousing the nationalistic fervor of the masses. As Rosemary Sayigh stated:
2 9 Shimon Shamir, "West Bank Refugees - Between Camp and Society," in Palestinian Society and
tltics. Ed. Joel Migda, (Princeton, NJ. : Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 149.
3 0 Shamir, p. 156.
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"...crystallization of the Palestinians' sense of a 'struggle-identity' would not have been
possible without the spark lit by Fateh
In 1970, Hussein's battles with Arafat and the Lebanese treatment of refugees
convinced the Palestinians that the Arab world waQ basically apathetic to their cause. 32 In
1973, after the Yom Kippur war, the perceived Arab victory, despite the lack of any direct
benefit to the Palestinian cause, incited a more militant nationalism within the occupied
territories. Arafat's establishment of a secret National Front in the occupied territories to
provide a future base for an independent regime, demonstrated a bUoider position by calling
for the existence of an independent Palestinian state.33
B. THE TRADITIONAL ELITES AND THE PLO
The villages and rural areas left intact after the Six-Day War, presented quite a different
story from that of the refugees. The traditional elites remained in power under the control
of Israeli military authorities. After several years however, their traditional roles began to
slowly change as a transfer of power from the hands of the elite to the occupying
authorities resulted in the eventual decapitation of the Palestinian leadership in the occupied
territories. "It soon became obvious that the Israeli military governors rather than the
traditional elites were the real repositories of power by virtue of their control over travel,
commerce, construction and nearly any other activity for which municipal permission was
required." The Israeli military gradually took control of all administrative functions in the
occupied territories, including budgetary expenditures.
3 1Sayigh, p. 147.
3 2 Abboushi, p. 11.
33Ann Mosely Lesch, Political Perceptions of the Palestinians on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,
(Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1980), p. 51.
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The initial West Bank political response after the war, was to support reunification
with Jordan and oppose any suggestion of autonomy or establishment of an independent
Palestinian state. Such an independent state would, they feared, be isolated from the Arab
world and dependent on Israel. The only way to pressure Palestine was through Jordan. 4
Prime Minister Moshe Dayan chose indirect rule through a civil affairs administration as the
best way to achieve stability in the newly acquired region. Plainclothes boarder guards
exercised control over the population through a network of informers. The existing
Jordanian political apparatus was to continue as the primary guiding force in administering
the West Bank and the traditional elites would be the Israeli government's connection with
the people of the territories.
The West Bank economic structure, through exposure and interaction, became closely
integrated with Israel's economy. This new political reality undermined the political power
of the traditional elite as the West Bank residents began to prosper from their employment
in Israel. As one author stated: "...the occupation has altered the local political
configuration within the West Bank and complicated the dynamics of elite formation.' 35
The traditional elites who once controlled the primary resources of jobs and capital in the
West Bank lost their power base as the general standard of living improved and the national
per capita GNP rose by 71% from 1968 to 1973.36 Israel further consolidated her power
base by controlling utility and water companies, Thus, to a large extent Israel was
successful in the initial years of occupation in developing a highly dependent patron-client
relationship wiLh the territories that frustrated any attempts to build an independent
34Emile Sahliyeh, In Search of Leadership: West Bank Politics Since 1967, (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1988), p. 24.
3 5 Helier, p. 186
36Heller, p. 193.
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community power structure. Jordan's King Hussein, in his efforts to prevent the
development of a West Bank leadership which did not support a return to the monarchy,
attempted to frustrate any local political development. His tactics however, became
increasingly ineffective as the power of the pro-Jordanian notables waned.
The growing political awareness of West Bank residents brought to the fore the
inequality of Jordan's treatment of the two banks, further discrediting the position of the
notables. State political and economic favors were given to the "narrow privileged stratum"
while the peasants were exploited by local businessmen and landowners. The open Israeli
job market created a greater middle class that no longer needed the services of the notables
to survive and who became acutely aware of the abuses and inequalities inherent in the o'
order. "Thus, evolving political-national consciousness coincided with socioeconomic
change to undermine the status of the traditional elite." 37
The position of the notables under the Jordanian rule was diluted under Israeli rule by
a government who refused to give the elites an opportunity to negotiate for the fate of the
West Bank. By denying the elites their traditional role as a link between the people and the
government, Israel further contributed to their loss of power in the territories. Attempts to
organize a territorial-wide political structure were continually foiled by both the Israeli and
Jordanian governments who both realized the potential dangers of the formation of a
cohesive, political body. The mayors of the towns and villages were to be the only formal,
organized political link between the people and the occupying government. "Only the
mayors retained a formal role, and that was restricted to specifically administrative matters,
of instrumental importance only to their towns and surrounding villages." 38
3 7 Heller, p. 200.
3X4Heller, p. 201.
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In 1972, Israel called the first municipal elections in the West Bank since the beginning
of the occupation. The contest was between the old established pro-Jordanian elites and a
younger "non-establishment" group favoring varying degrees of separatism. 39 The
elections were denounced by the Jordanian government who considered holding elections
tinder Israeli military rule to give recognition and legitimization to that rule. The possibility
also existed that the election of new political leaders might negatively effect Jordanian
influence. In an attempt to retain support in the territories, King Hussein announced a
peace plan that called for the establishment of a joint Palestinian-Jordanian federation with
both joint and autonomous governments and parliaments to include Jordan as one half of
the United Arab Kingdom and the West Bank and Gaza Strip as the other.40 Criticism
from both Arab and Palestinian leaders that Hussein was acting unilaterally helped the
King's plan to its quick demise. The plan was however, considered by some West Bank
leaders to merit consideration, and did influence their decision not to "...cooperate too
closely with the Israeli-sponsored election." 41
The PLO also opposed the elections for similar reasons as Jordan. PLO leaders
considered the elections a sign of cooperation between the local population and the military
government. Agreeing to the elections would be indicative of an acceptance of the
occupation. The PLO also considered the eiections the first step in Israel's attempt to
integrate West Bank local politics into the military government with the end result being a
loss of power and prestige for the PLO in the territories. As Sasson Levi, a former Colonel
3 9Peter Grose, "King's Expected Move Confuses West Bank as Local Vote Nears," in The New York
Times, (March 15, 1972), p. 6.
1 "Hussein Reported Proposing State for Palestinians," in The New York Times, (March 15, 1972),
p.1 .
'a1Peter Grose, "West Bank Vote Seems Imperiled," in The New York Times, (March 22, 1972), p. 8.
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in the Israeli Defense Force, stated: "...the holding of elections was the beginning of a
political process whereby a local leadership would develop under the military government,
either supported or encouraged by it, which would in time undermine the status of the PLO
and its leaders .... 42 The PLO's greatest fear was the formation of a moderate legitimate
local leadership that opposed PLO policy and was willing to negotiate with Israel.
Despite assassination threats from Palestinian guerrilla, fedayeen broadcasts of death
threats to candidates and pressures from Jordan who declared the elections "illegal,"
14,000 West Bank residents or 84% of the electorate voted on March 28, 1972. Such a
large turnout was indicative of Jordan's loss of control over the activities of the West
Bankers and the yet to blossom power of the PLO. In the end, there was no significant
change in the West Bank leadership.
All the trends indicated that the traditional leaders in most of the communities would
be returned to office, disappointing supporters of Palestinian self-government who
had hoped that a more adventurous and dynamic West Bank leadership might
emerge. 43
Among the newly elected leaders however, five were opposed to King Hussein and
committed to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. 44 Although no pro-
fatah guerrilla's were elected to positions (an indication, Israel claimed, of A1-Fatah's lack
of influence and power in the territories), the election of five leaders supporting an
independent state demonstrated a victory for the nationalists and a loss for the Hashemites.
4 2 Sasson Levi, "Local Government in the Administered Territories," in Judea. Samaria. and Gaza:
Views on the Present and Future, ed. Daniel J. Elazar, (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research, 1982), p. 116.
4 3 Peter Grose, "14,000 on West Bank Vote Amid Threats," in The New York Times, (March 29, 1972),
p. 3.
44"West Bank Elects Five Leaders Who Favor an Independent State," in The New York Times, (March
30, 1972), p. 6.
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The unheeded protests and threats of the Jordanian and guerrilla camps, based on their
professed view of the elections as a method of furthering Israeli control, were not totally
unfounded. The image of the new mayors as puppets of the Israeli establishment was
confirmed when a senior Israeli officer stated: "Any mayor who doesn't cooperate with the
occupation government will quickly find himself in Amman."
4 5
Jordan's loss of political influence in the territories intensified in the mid-1970's as the
nationalist viewpoint increasingly won out. The popularity of the PLO was also on the rise
as the primary representative of nationalist sentiments. Thoughts of returning to Jordan
and seeking an Arab solution to the Palestinian problem were replaced with majority
support for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.
The reasons for such a change of heart are many. Jordan's failure to actively
participate in the 1973 war resulted in a loss of its "...moral claim to restore its sovereignty
over the West Bank and to speak in the name of the Palestinian people." 46 The 1974 Arab
Summit in Rabat proclaiming the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people," was a further blow to Jordanian influence in the territories and marked
a turning point in the PLO's position in both the Arab and international worlds. Yasir
Arafat's organization now had legitimacy. The ascendancy of the PLO to a position of
leading political activist for the Palestinian cause, was further cemented by the growing
popularity of the Palestinian National Front (PNF) in the territories.
Prior to the Rabat conference, an independent political elite attempted to emerge within
the occupied territories. The PNF was considered by the new elite to be a "...politically
modernizing organ that would fill the vacuum left by the erosion of the pro-Jordanian
45"West Bank Elects Five Leaders .... " p. 6.
4 6Sahliyeh, p. 44.
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leaders' influence and political weight.' 47 A coalition of political groups, including
members of the Ba'th party, the Communist Party, Fatah, and the Democratic and Popular
Fronts, the PNF adopted a manifesto which advocated safeguarding Palestinian rights,
rejected the Allon Plan and any federation with Jordan, and called for the unity of the
Palestinian people in their struggle against occupation. 48 Although the Front was
originally established in concert with the PLO, the Palestinian leaders represented in the
front called for Arafat to moderate his position. Extremism, they warned, would only
serve to alienate the international community and perpetuate Israel's occupation. PNF
leaders supported a pan-Arab solution and urged the PLO to coordinate its activities with
Egypt and Syria. The more moderate position of the PNF could probably be accounted for
by the harsh realities of living under military occupation on a daily basis, while the PLO
leader lived in exile.
Despite the PNF's close association with West Bank residents, the PLO, suspicious of
any challenges to its leadership, attempted to constrain the PNF's policy-making powers.
The PLO "...came to view the PNF as no more than an organ in the occupied territories for
implementing the resolutions and directives of the PLO's political councils." 49 Arafat did
not want a local leadership to emerge and after 1974, the PLO actively engaged in
indoctrinating West Bank residents in PLO political attitudes to diminish the possibility of
the emergence of an independent leadership.
Despite the more moderate policies of the PNF and the widespread popularity and
political legitimacy they enjoyed in the territories, Israel strongly opposed the front,
labeling them as radicals who threatened security and order. As calls for an independent




Palestinian nation began to increase in frequency, Israel responded by arresting and often
deporting protestors and political leaders. Such a reaction incited more belligerent behavior
and thus began the never ending cycle of escalating actions and reactions. Deportations
also served to strengthen the PLO-West Bank ties as many deportees chose to join the PLO
in exile and were co-opted into to the executive committee.
Attempting to crush the PNF, over 150 political activists were arrested and more than
300 detained in the Spring/Summer of 1974. Such repressive acts however, did not inspire
the civil obedience Israel had hoped for. "The crackdown on the PNF had apparently
served to widen its appeal, as nationalist fervor spread in the occupied territories." 50 The
Front was eventually destroyed by Israeli authorities in 1977 after restrictions weakened its
leadership and political activity diminished in the territories. The Front did however,
succeed in adding vigor to the nationalist movement. The presence in the territories of an
organized leadership representing the ideology of the movement, provided inspiration for
the revolutionary tendencies of the masses. Thus, a potential moderating force in the
leadership of the Palestinians was forced out of existence with the more radical groups
prepared to act as replacements.
The 1976 elections in the West Bank saw the rise of a younger, more radical political
elite that professed their support for the formation of an independent Palestinian state.
Author David McDowall considered the election results a victory for the PLO but not
necessarily a defeat for Jordan or the traditional elites. The new mayors, according to
McDowall, were "[y]oung scions of old notable families of the towns they now
represented, persuaded by their families to stand for election in order to maintain the family
interest." 51 Despite the election of sons from notable families, the '76 elections represented
50Lesch, p. 58.
5 1McDowali, p. 100.
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a water shed in West Bank politics. McDowall's assertions seem incorrect as the old pro-
Jordanian elites appear to have lost their legitimate power base with 143 of the 191
contested seats won by newcomers, most of whom were running on slates supportive of
the PLO. 52 Of the incumbents, those who voiced support for the PLO were easily
reelected. The majority of the victors, according to a Washington Post editorial, were
"...Palestinian nationalists and Arab radicals who rode to victory on the frustrations
accumulated during nine years of Israeli occupation."53 Such a glaring change in the status
quo, did indeed represent a loss for Jordan and the traditional elites. Their primary basis of
power, after all, existed within the old Jordanian political structure which was now being
controlled by the pro-PLO nationalists. The elections were viewed as a test of popular
sentiments in the West Bank. The answer was loud and clear: The PLO represents the
Palestinian people.
After the demise of the PNF, the position of the new mayors, freed from party
affiliations, was further enhanced. Despite the disappointment the Israeli government felt
after the election failed to provide a leadership independent of the PLO, the new mayors
were given the freedom to speak openly on various political issues. In 1977, with the
Likud coalition coming to power, Israel's outlook towards the occupied territories changed
dramatically. They were no longer considered a temporary burden to be exchanged for
peace when the time was right, rather they were Judea, Samaria and Gaza, a significant part
of "Eretz Israel." The new Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, in his zeal to claim the
historic land, expropriated iand from Palestinians and intensified Jewish settlements. The
new government was in one respect a continuation of the old. Both had avoided making a
5 2Thomas W. Lippman, "Palestine Militants Win Vote," in The Washington Post, (April 14, 1976), p.
Al.
53
"West Bank Politics," editorial in The Washington Post, (April 15, 1976), p. A22.
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binding decision on Israel's territorial claims. The difference lies in the reasons for
maintaining the status quo. The Labor government emphasized security needs while the
Likud appealed to the historic land of Palestine, home of ancient Judaism. The settlement
policy of the Likud however, marred the difference as Begin closed the door on the option
of repartition. The Begin agenda gave the Israeli people a new sense of direction with
respect to the occupied territories. Begin's plan was "...to push toward the maximalist
fulfillment of the Zionist dream." 54 The moral issues of controlling half the world's
Palestinian population, could now be subordinated to the primary religious issue of keeping
Greater Isral for the Jews.
During the Begin prime ministership, the National Guidance Committee (NGC) was
formed in the occupied territories, in response to the new Israeli politics and the Camp
David Accords. The committee members believed the Accords "...would only legitimize
and perpetuate Israel's control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip." 55 Such a view was
understandable considering Begin's assertion that he would claim sovereignty over the
territories, thus limiting the autonomy agreement in the Accords. Despite the Committee's
often outspoken criticism of Israel, Defe-ise Minister Weizman (1977-80) allowed the NGC
to operate, encouraging members to become a partner with Israel on autonomy talks. The
Committee also criticized the PLO's position when Arafat was considering the autonomy
proposal as a possible step to the ultimate solution of the Palestinian problem. The strength
of opposition in the territories, manifested through demonstrations, quickly convinced
Arafat the only answer to Camp David was no. Disagreements between the NGC and
Fatah continued as more radical mayors emerged as leaders. "Fatah now feared that the
54 Aaron David Miller, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1987: A Retrospective," in The Middle East
Journal, (Summer, 1987), p. 352.
5 5 Sahliyeh, p. 75.
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NGC and the more radical faction's would wrest leadership of the Palestinian movement in
the territories completely from its grasp." 56 Israeli expulsion of Mayor Shak'a in 1979
resulted in a mass resignation of mayors and a loss of control for the committee. Arafat's
fear of losing power in the territories to the NGC resulted in an attempt to financially
"starve out" the organization by withholding Arab contribution funds maintained by a joint
PLO-Jordanian committee. Both the PLO and Jordan had a common interest in controlling
the radical nationalist forces that were attempting to take over the West Bank.
By the early 1980's, Moshe Dayan and Ezer Weizman, the moderators within Likud,
had resigned, thus ending the "permissive" era in Israeli policy. The new "ironfist" policy
outlawed the NGC, ended outside financial assistance to the territories, increased
censorship of the Arabic press, banned the circulation of daily newspapers and controlled
political dissidence through deportations. 57 In an attempt to establish a counterweight to
the nationalist groups and the PLO, Israel introduced the Village Leagues in 1981. The
purpose of the Leagues was to establish a network in the less politically active villages,
"...aimed at maintaining dependency and destroying the credibility of the nationalist urban
leadership." 58 A known extension of the Israeli political arm, the Leagues never gained
popular support and were disbanded at the start of the intifada.
The appointment of Menachem Milson as the first civil administrator in the territories
also marked a watershed in Israeli policy. Milson, a highly anti-PLO Arab affairs
specialist, was responsible for ending the flow of PLO money into the territories and
5 6 McDowall, p. 101.
5 7Sahliyeh, p. 85-86.
5 8 McDowall, p. 102.
27
banning the pro-PLO NGC. 59 According to Milson, the PLO was just one more outside
actor attempting to influence the residents of the occupied territories. 60 His failed attempts
to create a new leadership from the rural conservative politicians proved his assessment
incorrect, as loyalty to the PLO was unwavering. He did succeed, however, in removing
most pro-PLO leaders from their bureaucratic positions. The most violent reaction of the
I ikud hard-line stance, was the destruction of the PLO headquarters in Lebanon in 1982.
The end result was a feeling within the territories that a solution to their problem could not
be found on the "outside." As Faisal al-Husseini, a pro-PLO West Bank activist stated:
Before 1982, people here would sit and wait for liberation from outside. After 1982,
they started to ask what they could do to bring it about.61
Such a realignment of political thought is evident in the increase in recorded Palestinian
"disturbances" which rose from an average of 500 per year prior to 1982 to 4400 in 1982-
83.62
During the early to mid 1980's, the PLO did lose some popular support in the
territories due to the growth of anti-Arafat factions in Syria and a failure to make any
progress towards peace. The lack of a formal cohesive political leadership on the West
Bank however, kept any real opposition from developing. The alienation many
Palestinians felt from their leader in exile is expressed by a businessman in the occupied
territories:
59Ahiya Yitzhaki, "Milson's Year on the West Bank," in Middle East Review, (Winter, 1985), p. 37-48.




...the PLO is not here, nor do they experience this situation on a daily basis. We are
here, and we must deal with it. If this will make us leaders, so be it.63
Islamic groups such as the Islamic Jihad and the Muslim Brotherhood gained in popularity
but were not yet well organized enough to present any challenge to the PLO leadership.
The failure of the Palestinian communities to produce a leadership independent of the
PLO can be attributed to the often repressive politics used by the PLO to control any
dissension and to undermine the possible emergence of any alternative leadership. The
wider blame may however, be placed on Israel who through mass deportations immediately
following the '67 war, succeeded in decapitating any emerging leadership. Palestinian
specialist, Helena Cobban, blamed the Israeli government for asking too much of the
Palestinian politicians while offering nothing in return. 64 The lack of guarantees to pursue
investment projects and to protect historical rights to land ownership, left many who, "...as
of the late 1960's might still have been prepared to enter a political deal with Israel, ...no
alternative but to join the PLO's push for full independence." 65 Tihe outcome of Israel's
deportation policy has been the incorporation of the exiled into the command structure of
various PLO groups. Most deportees no doubt, left family members behind who, more
than likely, were influenced by the political affiliations of their loved ones. Thus, Israel, in
providing an immediate solution to a problem, may have helped to complicate any potential
long term solution. With the growing momentum of the intifada and the growth in
popularity of many new groups, the problem has become even more complex.
63Emile A. Nakhleh, "The West Bank and Gaza: 20 Years Later," in The Middle East Journal, (Spring,
1988), p. 223.
64 Cobban, p. 226.
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C. POLITICS IN GAZA
Perhaps because of the difficulty inherent in attempting to govern a territory with the
largest population per square mile of anywhere in the world, Israel has not attempted to
hold elections in the Gaza Strip. From 1967 until 1970 the city of Gaza was under direct
military rule by the Israeli government who was attempting to strengthen the occupation in
the area. An Arab City council was appointed from 1970 until 1972 under pressure from
local Palestinians. Serious conflict developed with military authorities over Israel's policy
of annexation of land, settlements and population relocations. The military authorities
dissolved the city council and appointed a military officer to govern Gaza when the city
refused to enact an annexation order of the Shati' refugee camp. 66 In 1975, a second
attempt was made to form a city council. The newly appointed mayor attempted to improve
conditions in the city and called upon the military government for assistance. Repeated
failed attempts to receive any assistance from the military government led the mayor and
city council members to tender their resignations. The Israeli government however,
convinced the municipal government to remain in power.
Islamic movements have been particularly popular among Gaza residents. The lower
education levels and extreme poverty that characterizes the Strip have been a breeding
ground for Islamic extremist movements. The Israeli appointed mayor and city council
members have little legitimacy among the increasingly radical occupants of the Gaza Strip.
66Emile A. Nakhleh, The West Bank and Gaza, (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, 1979), p. 16.
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D. PRFJLUDF, TO THE UPRISING
1. Popular Committees
The idea of developing the capabilities to survive independent of Israel, is not one
that began with the intifada, but rather one that because it did exist in a rudimentary form
prior to the intifada, contributed to the success of the uprising. The revival of the trade
unions in the late 1970's was one attempt to develop an infrastructure in the territories that
existed independent of Israel. The move away from Israeli and even Arab dependency
gained momentum in the early 1980's when a group of West Bank physicians realized the
inadequacies of the Israeli health care services provided to territory residents and decided to
do something about improving matters. The Union of Palestinian Medical Relief
Committees (UPMRC) was established in 1982 and resulted in the development of better
health care for the Palestinian people. The idea of independent committees began to take
shape in other areas of everyday life. The Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committee
(PARC) was established to improve agricultural productivity in the territories through
research and education and to encourage self-sufficiency among residents by encouraging
the planting of small gardens. Through the popular movement, self-reliance was promoted
under the premise that "[u]ntil Palestinians learnt to rely upon themselves and their own
productivity...there could be no hope of liberation." 67
The leadership of such popular committees was diffused to ensure the
continuation of the movement if one or more leaders were to be deported or jailed. "Each
committee was aware of the dangers of individual or mass arrest, and contingency plans
were made for the automatic replacement of committee members should they be
arrested. " 68 Such a plan appears to have been largely successful so much so that it has
6 7 McDowail, p. 117.
68McDowall, p. 116.
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continued to be a primary reason why the intifada continues despite massive arrests by
Israeli authorities and repeated claims that the "leaders" of the uprising have been arrested.
These early committees also provided the institutional infrastructure required for the intifada
to achieve its expressed aim of developing complete independence from Israel. Boycotting
Israeli products and limiting employment across the Green Line are just two ways the
leaders of the intifada have attempted to achieve such a goal. The following chapters will
provided additional information on how successful such methods have been in achieving
the goals of the uprising.
2. Precipitating Incidents
Prior to the uprising of 1987, there were several specific precipitating incidents.
The hang glider attack on Israeli soldiers by a Palestinian guerrilla and the Israeli truck
collusion with a Palestinian van, the loss of top billing for the Palestinian problem at the
Amman Arab summit in November of 1987, were important catalysts however, something
much deeper existed in the hearts and minds of the Palestinian people. Israel's "iron fist
policy", the failure of the PLO to make any significant progress towards the establishment
of an independent Palestinian state, the lack of attention given to the Palestinian question at
the Arab Summit in Amman in November of 1987. the vears of build up frustrations at
lacking citizenship and status in their own homeland, and the repression of identity and
political ideology, are all factors that combine to produce a powder keg, ready to explode
with minimal provocation. "Any occupation, even if relatively mild, any rule of one people
by another, no matter how benevolent, will inevitably be seen as worse than a dictatorship
of one's own kind." 69
6 9 Christison, p. 124.
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In 1981, Abu Iyyad, Arafat's right hand man wrote about the Palestinians' need
for "a flag and a passport." 70 Such a statement expresses a recurring theme in the quest for
Palestinian self-determination. The Palestinian people need a country with which to
identify. For it is through this identification as a citizen of a nation that one develops his
own sense of identity and self worth and thus develops an understanding of his relative
position in the universe. The sense of frustration and alienation the Palestinian people often
feel is understandable in light of their lack of a political and national structure with which to
identify. As one Palestinian simply stated: "[We] want a normal life: work education,
freedom to travel, to study, to be able to die where we belong." 7 1
Under military occupation, Palestinians have learned the difference between the
laws that govern their everyday life and the laws that govern the lives of the Israeli settlers
in the territories. More than 1200 military regulations control the daily lives of Palestinians
who are subject to arbitrary arrest, detention and often torture while under detention.
Torture of Arab prisoners is so widespread and systematic that it cannot be dismissed
as 'rogue cops' exceeding orders. It appears to be sanctioned as deliberate policy. 72
Press censorship is widespread in the territories as is control of political parties and
expression of dissension. The lack of control and powerlessness Palestinians feel ovel
their every day lives, is exacerbated by an inequitable system of taxation and a lack of input
into how fund are expended. Collective punishment is another cause for the growing anger
in the Palestinian communities. Demolition of houses is an often used tool by the IDF
70Gidon W. Gottlieb, "Israel and the Palestinians," in Foreign Affairs, (Fall, 1989), p. 123.
71Alan Cowell, "For the Palestinians in Diaspora, The Vision Fades but Won't Die," in The New York
Times, (March 24, 1989), p. A6.
72Gail Pressberg, "The Uprising: Causes and Consequences," in Journal of Palestine Studies, (Sping,
1988), p. 39.
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against Palestinians and their families who are thought to have participated in illegal
political or terrorist activities. Thus, the entire family is forced to bare the punishment of
one family member's possible wrong doing.73
While the loss of a home can be devastating in the villages, residents of the
refugee camps do not hold the same sentimental attachments to their homes. The refugees
consider their real homes to be those of their ancestors not the ghetto like dwellings of the
camp. In interviews with residents of the Dhelisheh refugee camp, The New York Times
presented a picture of lost hope and despair. As one resident explained:
The life of animals is better than the life of refugees. That is why we here in
Dhelisheh feel the misery of life and despair. 74
The pervasive feeling is that there is nothing to lose by perpetrating violent acts against
Israeli soldiers and settlers for the good of the intifada. Village residents on the other hand,
are not as willing to accept the retaliatory acts of the Israeli soldiers. They have more to
lose and will not therefore, cross the line that will result in strong collective retaliatory acts
against village residents. They do not want to lose their homes. With the existence of such
a variance in living conditions it is easy to see why attitudes between the two groups are so
d:.fferent and why the uprising has taken root primarily in the refugee camps where
radicalism and terrorism are accepted and nurtured.
To understand the anger and resentment possessing the people of the intifada, one
must also understand the youth of the territories as they are the primary stone throwers and
instigators of attacks. Although they have no personal knowledge of life before the
occupation, they do have a profound understanding of life under Israeli rule. A New York
73 Pressbcrg, p. 40.
14 Joel Brinkley, "Inside the Intifada," in The New York Times Magazine, (October 29, 1989), p. 38.
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Times interview with a young West Bank resident presents a startling picture of life under
occupation through the eyes of a child.
When we were growing up.. .the only Israelis we -new, the only ones we ever saw,
were the soldiers. We saw them shoot tear gas, we saw them beat people. And I
remember when I was little, when we'd go home from school and put away the
books, we'd get out a piece of wood and carve a gun. Then we'd play a game, the
Palestinians and the Israelis, with stones and guns. We had no swings. That was
our game.75
Living under occupation has perhaps made the children of the territories numb to
acts of violence. Not unlike the children of the ghetto to whom life has repeatedly been
regarded as less than sacred and therefore holds little value as they reach adulthood, the
Palestinian children have lived with violence and have learned to hate and not to fear. Their
immediate goal is to end the occupation through any available means. Thus, the stage has
been set for the growth of an uprising. The people of the territories have reached their
limits and can no longer accept their social, political or economic condition. As one
Palestinian stated:
It is a miserable life. I admit we are committing suicide, but we cannot retreat. Our
children want an end to the occupation and they are running the show. What are we
going to tell them, we don't want independence? I would be degraded in the eyes of
my children if I told them to stop. 76
7 5joel Brinkley, "The Arab Uprising After Two Years: Voices From Both Sides," in The New York
Times, (December 10, 1989), p. 26.
7 6 Brinkley, "The Arab Upr'sing After Two Years..," p.34
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III. THE EXTERNAL LEADERSHIP
Today as chairman of the PLO, Yasir Arafat presides over a factious and unwieldy
organization. There is constant tension between various constituent elements of the
PLO and often intense competition for both resources and the hearts and minds of the
Palestinian masses. 77
Such a statement aptly describes the precarious position that Yasir Arafat has come to
accept as the chief executive of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) since 1969.
As the leader of the PLO, Arafat has attempted to balance the radical and moderate forces of
the various groups comprising the PLO and in doing so has often found himself paralyzed
with indecision. The Palestinian National Council (PNC), or parliament of the PLO,
contains the workings of a democratic political organization and is the primary force
controlling Arafat's actions. Although Arafat is limited in his actions by the PNC, he often
expresses political policy without the blessing of the council. Without the support of the
Palestinian people, such actions would quickly extinguish Arafat's political career. As
leader of the PLO, Arafat's diplomatic ability and powers of persuasion are his most
powerful tools.
For many years considered a terrorist organization, Arafat has worked long and hard
to change his image from terrorist to peace maker much as Gorbachev has transformed the
Soviet international image. The many factions representing Palestinian nationalism
however, often act independent and contrary to the stated political objectives of the PLO.
Such independent groups are usually negatively associated with the PLO when one has
claimed responsibility for a terrorist act. Convincing the world and the west in particular,
7 7 Livingstone and Halevy, p. 87.
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that the PLO is a peace loving organization that only wants a homeland frr its poor
oppressed people, is a difficult task indeed.
The rise of the intifada has created a new political reality that has had a profound effect
on Arafat and the factions of the PLO. All indications are that the uprising began internally
and has since its beginnings (although it is not clear when), developed its own internal
leadership. This new leadership is, by all indications, loyal to the PLO, but it is also a
force to be reckoned with. Since the intifada, the PLO can no longer set policy without
considering the political heartbeat of the Palestinians of the territories. What author Cheryl
Rubenberg stated several years ago is even more true today.
The PLO could not survive without the support of the Palestinian people. It is that
support which gives the organization its legitimacy. 78
The political accommodations recently made by Arafat and the PLO, according to
Mohammad Hallaj, editor of Palestinian Perspective, support changing political attitudes
within the territories. 79 Thus, despite criticism from leaders of various PLO factions,
Arafat's accommodationist position has gained legitimacy through the support of the
Palestinians of the occupied territories who must suffer the consequences of occupation and
have come to understand the failure of a hard-line, inflexible political stance.
The development and continuation of the uprising as an internal movement with its
own leadership has created a new sense of pride among the people of the territories. If the
PLO is to retain its legitimacy as the symbol and leader of the Palestinian people, it must
follow and lead at the same time. The effect of such a relationship has been to unify
elements of the PLO behind a common cause; the continuation of the struggle until the
78 Cheryl Rubcnberg, The Palestine Liberation Organization: Its Institutional Infrastructure, (Belmont,
MA: The Institute of Arab Studies, 1983), p. 14.
79Author's interview on September 24, 1990.
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liberation of the people and their land. Mr. Hallaj, referred to the new relationship of
factions to Arafat as "loyal opposition" with PLO groups accepting Arafat's leadership
despite any disagreement they may have with his political agenda. Such a policy he
claimed, accounts for the control of fractionalization and limited dissidence among various
groups.
Although there is little doubt the Palestinians support the political program and symbol
of the PLO as the representative of the nationalist movement, there is growing speculation
that the actual leadership of the PLO may be losing its legitimacy among the young local
leaders of the intifada. Over time Arafat has perhaps become more of a symbol of
Palestinian nationalism than an effective leader/negotiator of the Palestinian cause. An
analysis of Arafat and the PLO's control over the activities of the intifada is required to
determine how much power the organization and its leader actually wield within the
territories and if they do indeed represent the Palestinian people beyond symbolism.
In this chapter I will consider the PLO mainstream organizations and PLO affiliate
factions and what part each has played in the control of the intifada and what possible
effects the intifada has had on the power positions of each group.
A. ARAFAT AND THE PLO MAINSTREAM
Along with Arafat's own Fatah organization, the PLO includes several factions that are
considered loyal to Arafat but whose leaders often express positions in direct conflict with
those of Arafat. The Popular Front the the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) are considered Marxist-oriented
and maintain a limited degree of political and financial autonomy. As the leftist front, the
two groups have consistently opposed the acceptance of UN resolution 242. The two
groups have also objected to any joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation to peace talks, citing
the dilution of PLO representative authority as their reason. After the PLO split of 1983,
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the two groups left the fold only to return in 1987 with a somewhat lowered position within
the PLO. Despite past disagreements with Arafat's politics, the two organizations
supported the PNC political program accepting resolutions 242 and 338 as a basis for
negotiations in 1988.80 The Palestinian Communist Party is a third organization with some
prominence within the PLO, and is represented in the internal Unified National Leadership
of the Uprising. However, because of its limited expression of political ideology, it will be
omitted from this paper.
1. Fatah and Arafat
Although Arafat is the leader of the PLO, he continues to be most closely
identified with the faction he fathered in the early 1950's. Controlling a majority of the
seats in the PNC, Fatah has dominated the PLO since its first public appearance in 1965.
Fatah has remained in the forefront of the Palestinian nationalist movement primality due to
"...its clear autonomy from Arab governments and single-minded pursuit of independent
decision-making, and its action-oriented approach, reflected in its pre-eminence in
conducting military operations against Israel. ''81
In 1983, the PLO's loss of its base of operations in Lebanon after the Israeli
attack, fragmented the organizational structure and resulted in a splintering of Fatah. Freed
from the constraints of the waring factions, Fatah was able to develop a strong base of
support in the occupied territories. Arafat, and his right hand man, Khalil al-Wazir (Abu
Jihad), one of the founders of Fatah, were the primary political external PLO political
figures in the territories during the 1980's. Al-Wazir was responsible for establishing an
underground political network of PLO supporters. As director of Fatah's Occupied
80 Yezid Sayigh, "Struggle Within, Struggle Without: The Transformation of PLO Politics Since
1982," in International Affairs, (Spring, 1989), p. 254-255.
8 1Sayigh, p. 235
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Homeland Bureau and later, the PLO representative on the Palestinian-Jordanian Joint
Committee, he was able to establish direct contact with prominent political figures in the
territories. While living in Amman, al-Wazir established the shabibah or youth movement
that was responsible for organizing community based support committees in an attempt to
develop independence for Israeli control. These support groups were the precursors to the
popular committees that have become the backbone of the intifada. Although initially a
primarily civic/quasi-political group, the shabibah were, after the start of the intifada,
responsible for conducting large demonstrations and initiating acts of violence against both
Israelis and suspected Palestinian informants. 82
Fatah, therefore played an indirect role in developing the superstructure that
helped to maintain the momentum of the intifada once it began. The murder of Khalil
Wazir on April 16, 1988 was a blow to the Fatah establishment, but, much to the
disappointment of the Israeli Government, did not dampen the spirit of the intifada. In
reality, it appeared to have the opposite effect as angry Palestinians sought to avenge the
death of their leader. The network of PLO supporters and the independent community
organizations established by Wazir in the territories, had apparently become internally self-
sufficient by the time of his death and therefore did not require his guidance to continue.
A1-Wazir's close personal contact with West Bank Fatah supporters also helped ensure
Fatah's continuing prominence as the dominant political force in the territories.
When the uprising began in mid-December of 1987 in the Gaza Strip, by all
indications, Arafat was caught by surprise. He did not however, waste any time in
realizing the potential political benefits of the uprising and by December 18, 1987, the PLO
attempted to set the political agenda of the uprising. Commenting on the "heroic
steadfastness" of the people, the Voice of the PLO radio, broadcast the following comment
8 2 Sayigh, p. 257.
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on the uprising: "This continuation proves that the iron will of the people to resist and
confront occupation cannot soften or retreat until we extract our national inalienable rights,
particularly our right to repatriation, self-determination, and an independent state under the
leadership of the PLO, the sole, legitimate representative. " 83 In an attempt to further
emphasize the leadership of the PLO, the broadcaster stated: "It [the uprising] has also
affirmed the people's rallying around the PLO and their strong rejection of all suspect calls
and projects aimed at dominating people ...." Thus, although a particular political goal was
probably not a consideration when the masses began the uprising, the PLO provided the
inspiration needed to energize the riots into a mass movement with the goal of liberation.
Emphasizing the leadership role of the PLO in the broadcasts, Arafat ensured the
Palestinians in the occupied territories did not forget to whom they owed their allegiance.
Although there were no clear indications at the onset of the intifada that the PLO
had control over events, there were however, obvious attempts to gain influence over the
instigators and develop the riots into a mass movement capable of being sustained until
political objectives could be achieved. LTCOL Jack Connor, U.S. Army, a U.S. Defense
Attache in Israel when the intifada began, saw the uprising as a phenomena of "hysteria"
resulting from pent up anger and frustration, rather than an awakening of nationalistic
fervor . 4 Arafat's personal assessment of the intifada disagrees with such a position:
What is happening, is not the result of despair, as the Israelis would like to suggest,
but an expression of the desire to implement this political platform. In all my
speeches last year, and in my daily instruction, I have called the young people of the
occupied territories the new generals and the new military chiefs. 85
83Baghdad, Voice of the PLO, December 18, 1987, as translated in Foreign Broadcast Information
Service (FBIS)-NES, December 21, 1987, p. 5.
84Author's interview on September 25, 1990.
85Paris, Le Monde, January 16, 1988, as translated in FBIS-NES, January 18, 1988, p. 3.
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Arafat, the politician, had designed a political program for the intifada that had been born
without one. As the leader of the Palestinian people, Arafat was determined to ensure all
were eaucated on why they initiated the intifada. His statemnent of flattery to the youth
responsible for the uprising appears to be an attempt to ingratiate himself to them and
further solidify the position of the PLO as leader of the Palestinian nationalist movement
and the intifada. Being a shrewd politician, Arafat was well aware of the intifada's
potential for political gain through world media attention. He also realized the need to
develop a coordinated, well organized leadership within the territories to ensure the
continuation of the uprising's momentum. Arafat must also ensure any new leadership
commits its loyalty to the PLO.
Arafat's attempt to take control of the uprising is evident in statements made in late
December to the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians and during an interview in London. His
first address to the people of the territories on December 18 emphasized the necessity of
refraining from the use of weapons.
Blood has triumphed over the sword. Again I say that blood has triumphed over the
sword, despite all their attempts to subdue a people, conquer their will, and destroy
them. 86
At the end of his broadcast, Arafat stressed "revolution until victory" in an attempt to
inspire the masses to continue the uprising. During an interview two days later, Arafat
emphasized the persistent character of the uprising. "Our Palestinian people, through
resolve and firm decision, will never give in or relent before they achieve their inalienable
national rights, especially their right to live like other people and be free from all kinds of
86Baghdad, Voice of the PLO in Arabic, December 18, 1987, as translated in FBIS-NES, December 23,
1987, p. 3.
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tutelage, occupation and coercion..." 87 Thus, it appears that Arafat's goals at the SLi." of
the uprising were to ensure its continuation through verbal encouragement and
1;- ,oiuLiu;.,y rncLonc and to Keep the peopie from escalating the attacks into armed
violence. "The Palestinians are aware of the respect and sympathy they are gaining in the
clashes between stones and guns and intend to use it." 88 If the Palestinians began using
arms to fight the Israelis, the growing international sympathy for the Palestinian cause
would be lost, as Israeli armed retaliation would be deemed an appropriate and necessary
response.
Although the PLO may have immediately seized the political initiative, it is
difficult to say whether Arafat had any direct control over the activities of the intifada. By
late January however, he was ready to take credit for the internal organization of the
uprising. In an interview with Al-Hawadith Arafat explained the popular committees that
have been formed in every village and the uprising fund established to support the people
of the intifada. He also alludes to the PLO liaisons with the internal forces.
We have also set up commands in the West Bank and Gaza and they are in constant
contact with the emergency committee outside. We, from the top of the pyramid to
the base, are determined to back the uprising and perpetuate the uprising, wave after
wave. 89
Providing funds to sustain the uprising and help alleviate the suffering of the people who
were asked to observe strike days and refrain from purchasing Israeli made products, was
probably a successful method of gaining access to and influence over the internal leaders of
87 London, Al-Sharq AI-Awsat in Arabic, December 20, 1987, as translated in FBIS-NES, December 20,
1987, p. 3.
88Paris, Le Monde, January 16, 1988, pp. 1.2, as translated in FBIS-NES, January 21, 1988, p. 3.
89 London, AI-Hawadith in Arabic, January 29, 1988, pp.22-24, as translated in FBIS-NES, January 25,
1988, p. 5.
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the uprising. Arafat's claim to have set up "commands" in the West Bank and Gaza may be
an indication that the PLO was indeed responsible for setting up the internal control
u1a .. ....- " -'!U I-A "a-'i-- L-aders'dp of the Uprising (UN.LU)
Israeli author Ze'ev Schiff, in a commentary in Ha'aretz on February 7, 1988
claimed the PLO di4 not yet have control over the local leaders but that "...it [was] only a
question of time before it [the PLOJ attainfed] greater coordination among the leaders of the
rebellion in the territories."90 Such a statement recognizes the centrality of the PLO to the
Palestinian issue and the connection the Palestinian people feel to their ieadership on the
outside. But at the same time, it contradicts Arafat's assertions of the close coordination
between the two ieader.hipq at the start of the intifada.
By mid-March, Arafat asserted there was a "strong relaionship" between the PLO
and the base inside the territories. He further claimed the internal leaflets that were being
distributed to the people confirmed the support for the "revolutionary leadership." To
emphasize the PLO's connection with the Palestinian people, he explained what the PLO
means to the Palestinian people; "...identity after attempts have been made to deprive
Palestinians of their national identity; dignity after attempts have been made for years to
trample on Palestinian dignity; and a future after attempts have been made to deprive the
Palestinians of a future."9 1 His statement on the military operations and "our" decision not
to use weapons appears to be a further attempt to prove the PLO's control over the
uprising. Demonstrating his position as leader of the uprising, Arafat presented the phases
of the uprising, stating the first and second phases were finished and the third and forth
phases of civil disobedience were beginning. When asked what might happen if the
90Tel Aviv, Ha'retz in Hebrew, February 7, 1988, p.9, as translated in FBIS-NES, February 8, 1988,
p. 31.
9 1Cairo, Al-Wafd in Arabic, March 14 1988, p.5, translated in FBIS-NES, March 17, 1988, p. 5.
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uprising is not successful in achieving its political goals, Arafat mentioned the possibility of
using firearms in the territories.
In December of 1988, Arafat formally renounced terrorism and accepted U.N.
resolutions 242 and 338, and explicitly recognized Israel's right to exist within secure and
recognized boarders. Despite criticism both within the PLO mainstream and from radical
factions outside, Arafat was able to make such a bold move which contradicted the PLO's
own charter calling for the destruction of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state
in all of Palestine, because of the widespread support from inside the territories. Had such
a statement been made prematurely, Arafat would have been committing political suicide.
The time had come however, for moderating forces to take control.
To maintain his position as the symbol of Palestinian nationalism and his
organizations positin as sole political representative of the Palestinia i people, Yasir
Arafat has had to listen to the people of the territories and respond to their desires. His
political policy must mirror his constituents or support will be lost. As Rashid Kialidi, a
Palestinian-American professor from the University of Chicago stated: "The P.L.O. cannot
demand anything less than what the Palestinians inside are demanding." 92 By accepting
resolutions 242 and 338, the PLO demonstrated their understanding of the Palestinian
desires to move the peace process forward. In an interview on November 1, 1988, PLO
member al-Hurani echoed the UNLU's call on the PLO leadership to establish a "realistic
political program" by adopting resolutions that will "...open horizons before the peace
process and the convening of the international conference." 93
92 youssef M. Ibrahim "A Palestinian Revolution Without the P.L.O.," in The New York Times,
(February 14, 1988), p. D1.
9 3 Dubay, Al-Bavan in Arabic, November 1 1988, p. 21, as translated in FBIS-NES, November 3, 1988,
p. 3.
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The U.S. decision to open diplomatic relations with the PLO was a political
triumph for Arafat and the Palestinian people who considered the U.S. to be the primary
link to Israt! and -ossibly the one force that could propel Israel into negotiating with the
PLO. Arafat's agenda on the intifada could only be to continue financial assistance and
verbal support. On February 13, 1989 Arafat warned of "...national civil disobedience
which would lead to a total paralysis of life in the occupied terrtories-if the U.S. does not
succeed in convincing Israel to accept one of two things: Direct negotiation with the PLO
or attending an international conference." 94 Arafat's hard-line rhetoric was undoubtedly an
attempt to show the people of the territories he was indeed working for them. The fact that
two months after the PLO's declaration, Israeli leaders continued to thumb their noses at
the Palestinians and instead institute a new iron-fist policy in the territories, heated tempers
and necessitated a strong reaction by the PLO's leader. Once again demonstrating control
over the intifada, Arafat warned of calling off the order to refrain from returning fire against
the Israelis.
As the intifada continues and the PLO fails to make any progress towards the
establishment of a Palestinian state, Arafat's job has beeii to continue maintaining the
PLO's position as leader of the Palestinians. With internal conflict occurring with
increasing frequency, Arafat's primary message to the territories has been "unity." On
March 9, 1989, he called for: "More organization in all fields of militant action to entrench
mass authority...with the weapon of brotherhood, genuineness, and love, which the
Palestinian revolution has always sharpened." 95 Several weeks later in a message to the
9 4 Algiers, Voice of Palestine in Arabic, February 13, 1989, as translated in FBIS-NES, February 14,
1989, p. 3.
9 5 Sanaa, Voice of Palestine, March 9, 1989, as translated in FBIS-NES, March 14, 1989, p. 5.
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territories, he used the words unity, cohesion and organization several times.96 One day
later, in an address to the territories, unity was once again a primary theme. The harsh
criticism of Arafat's moderate position by Syrian radicals broadcasting to the te.ritories on
AI-Quds clandestine radio was probably one reason for the unity call. The increasing
attempts by the Islamic group Hamas to control the movement of the intifada, was another.
Internal fractionalization, Arafat knew only too well, would destroy the momentum of the
intifada and the great hopes for peace that had come with it. Unity was needed to fight
against the common enemy.
Another problem that threatened to divide the internal forces was the killing of
Palestinians suspected of being collaborators without proper due process, by young
members of the internal leadership network. The killings were getting out of control and
the image of the intifada was beginning to tarnish in the media. In June of 1989 Arafat
once again sent a call for unity to the territories.
Every party, movement, or group has the right to air its opinions, but within the
framework of the national unified action. Nobody has the right to impose himself on
any citizen. All citizens are equal. The people are the stronger. They are our
protective umbrella. Therefore, I urge you to show further affection, respect, and
sound revolutionary ethics... 9 7
In September, he called for unity among the ranks, stating: "No revolution can emerge
victorious unless supported by its masses, and no militant march can continue without
sound revolutionary discipline." 98 Repeating his order to control the killings of fellow
96Baghdad, Voice of the PLO, March 19, 1989, as translated in FBIS-NES, March 21, 1989, p. 11.
97Sanaa, Voice of Palestine in Arabic, June 8, 1989, as translated in FBIS-NES, June 9, 1989, p. 8.
98Kuwait, AI-Ra'y Al'amm, September 11, 1989, p. 16, as translated in FBIS-NES, September 14,
1989, p. 7.
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Palestinians suspected of collaborating with the enemy, Arafat used the biblical quote, "Let
he who is without sin cast the first stone" as a caution to the perpetrators.
The need to repeatedly emphasize unity in the territories and preach against the
killing of fellow Palestinians, demonstrates a lack of PLO control over the activities of the
intifada. Arafat himself admitted when referring to the killing of suspected collaborators:
"We have experienced, and I say this frankly, some indiscipline."99 Attempting to lead a
people through a "revolution" from several thousand miles away is no easy task. Arafat
therefore must provide the financial support and revolutionary inspiration needed to give
the internal leadership legitimacy and motivation and to ensure continuing support for the
PLO. As the months pass and no resolution is in sight, however, his task will become
increasingly difficult. The suspension of U.S. dialogue with the PLO in June of 1990 has
dampened the spirits of the West Bank and Gaza occupants who considered the meetings a
step towards negotiations with Israel. The minimal progress and low level encounters that
characterized the meetings however, had prevented any significant build-up of hope in the
territories. As one PLO official explained: "...the Palestinian-U.S. dialogue was stillborn
and offered nothing to the Palestinian cause but stalemating the peace efforts." 1°
2. The PFLP and George Habash
The Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine was formed in 1967 by its
current leader, Dr. George Habash. The PFLP is headquartered in Damascus and much to
Arafat's dislike, maintains close ties with Syria. Although the PFLP is a member of the
PLO, it is considered financiilly independent and often politically independent as well.
Habash is considered to be the leader of the "internationalist element" within the PLO
99Cairo, AI-Musawwar in Arabic, January 19, 1990, pp. 14-21, 98, as translated in FBIS-NES, January
25, 1990, p. 2.
1 0Cairo, MENA in Arabic, June 21 1990, as translated in FEIS-NES, June 21, 1990, p. 6.
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espousing the overthrow of "reactionary regimes" like Saudi Arabia and Jordan and
suggesting they be replaced with 'progressive' regimes. The establishment of a Palestinian
state is secondary on his political agenda. 10 1 In comparison, Arafat is a "nationalist" who
considers the establishment of a Palestinian state as the primary goal of the "revolution."
Although the nationalist position maintains prominence in Palestinian politics, particularly
in the wake of the intifada, Dr. Habash continues to assert the internationalist position.
Shortly after the uprising began, Habash declared: "...the Palestinian people will win the
battle of freedom only through a cohesion of struggle with the Arab and international
struggle." 102 Supporting a pan-Arab solution to the Palestinian dilemma, Habash has
called on members of the Arab world to recognize their responsibility and provide support
to the uprising.
Dr. Habash believes the PLO leadership is too far removed from the Palestinian
people to attempt to control the intifada or to act as interlocutor in the peace process. He
has asserted that the internal leadership of the UNLU in the only leadership that holds the
right to end the uprising and make a truce with Israel. Any interference from the outside,
he claimed, "...would damage the uprising."'1 3 In a statement contradictory to Arafat,
Habash credited the people of the occupied territories with taking the initiative to "settle
their accounts" with the enemy. In discussing the role of the PLO in supporting the
intifada, Habash declared the basic mission was to transform the PLO "...from a
bureaucratic organization into a militant organization that meets our national aspirations and
10 ILivingstone and Halevy, p. 209.
102paris, Radio Monte Carlo in Arabic, December 21, 1987, as translated in FBIS-NES, December 22,
1987, p. 5.
103Kuwait, KUNA in English, February 8, 1988, in FBIS-NES, February 9, 1988, p. 10.
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is capable of leading and mobilizing the masses ..... 104 Thus, while Arafat has repeatedly
attempted to strengthen the PLO's position in the territories, Habash has preferred to give
credit and power to the internal leadership while continuing to claim the PLO as the sole
legitimate representative of the people. Habash's statements on increasing PLO militancy
also undermine Arafat's diplomatic attempts to transform the PLO's international image
from terrorist organization to legitimate representative of the Palestinian cause.
After the Geneva conference, the PFLP leader criticized Arafat and his recognition
of Israel in particular. Denouncing the statements as those of Arafat alone, Habash claimed
they were not official PLO policy and therefore were not binding on the PLO. 10 5 When
Arafat professed his readiness to "go to Jerusalem," the PFLP considered the move an
indication of Arafat's attac-hment to the U.S. Comparing the PLO leader's statement to the
unilateral action taken by Sadat at Camp David, a PFLP spokesman responded: "The
readiness expressed by the PLO Executive Committee chairman to follow A1-Sadat's steps
does not only imply capitulationist tendencies, but also indicates how far Arafat is ready to
go in his response to Washington's conditions."' 106 Such a statement aptly describes the
PFLP's position on cooperating with Israeli officials in any regard. Although the PFLP
does have some supporters in the territories (the PFLP along with the DFLP, Fatah and
possibly Hamas are represented in the UNLU), judging from the positive reactions in the
territories to Arafat's Geneva speech, Habash does not represent the majority position.
104AI-Quds Palestinian Arab Radio in Arabic, December 13, 1989, as translated in FBIS-NES,
December 18, 1989, p. 6.
105Voice of the Mountain in Arabic to Lebanon, December 28, 1988, as translated in FBIS-NES,
December 29, 1988, p. 13.
10 6 Paris, Radio Monte Carlo in Arabic, March 13, 1989, as translated in FBIS-NES, March 14, 1989,
p. 5.
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Despite his often bold criticisms of the PLO leader, Habash continues to remain in
the PLO mainstream. In an almost hypocritical fashion, Habash has called for "unity"
within the PLO ranks. Justifying his position the PFLP leader stated: "...when we speak
of the importance of national Palestinian unity, we do not do it for 'Arafat's black eyes, but
because of the eyes of the children and youths throwing stones at the enemy, who see
'Arafat as their leader.... ,107 In a rare show of support for the PLO leader Dr. Habash
endorsed Arafat as the president of the State of Palestine in April of 1989.108 Thus,
Habash admits to the preeminence of Arafat's position in the territories as leader of the
Palestinian struggle, but he himself supports Palestinian unity for the sake of the people
and the intifada, not because of allegiance to Arafat.
Both inside and out of the territories, the PFLP has continued to promote armed
struggle to achieve revolutionary goals.
We can never look upon the stone as an alternative to the rifle. In the same way the
rifle has paved the way for the stone, the stone is supposed to pave the way for a new
wave of escalated armed struggle. 1°9
Such a position has kept support in the territories for the PFLP to a minimum in the past.
Arafat's repeated warnings that if the Israeli killings in the territories continue, he will have
no choice but to end the ban on using firearms, may give the Habash position legitimacy in
the future. The most recent upsurge in violence against Israeli citizens using lethal
weapons is one indication the "armed struggle" may have already begun.
107Tel Aviv, Ha'aetz in Hebrew, November 8, 1989, p.11, as translated in FBIS, NES, November 15,
1989, p. 25.
10 8 Kuwati, KUNA in English, April 2, 1989, as printed in FBIS-NES, April 3, 1989, p. 3.
10 9 Livingstone and Halevy, p. 211.
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3. The DFLP and Nayif Hawatimah
The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), like the PFLP is
considered a radical left wing of the PLO. Head quartered in Damascus, it branched off of
the PFLP in 1969 (by Marxists with close ties to the Soviet Union), but maintains a similar
political stance on many issues. Nayif Hawatimah, leader of the DFLP, is a Christian
Palestinian born in Jordan and like Habash, was considered a leading member of the Arab
nationalist movement. His young followers "...called themselves Marxist Leninists,
denounced the Arab regimes as 'petty bourgeois,' advocated the strcng:hening of the
PLO's ties with the Soviet bloc, and in 1969 called for the establishment in Palestine of a
'popular democratic Palestinian state' for Arabs and Jews."110 Although the Democratic
Front's political agenda conflicts with Arafat's two state solution, Hawatimah is less
outspoken than Habash and less critical of Arafat, perhaps owing to his reliance on Fatah
for funding.
At the start of the uprising, Hawatimah emphasized the connection between the
internal and external leaderships, dismissing reports calling the uprising "spontaneous" as
an attempt to isolate the Palestinians of the territories from their leaders on the outside. 111
An official of the DFLP explicitly named the PLO as the leader of the uprising. "The
course of the uprising clearly proves.. .it represents an organized movement led by the Joint
Palestinian Command in the occupied territories which is controlled by the Palestine
Liberation Organization."'112
1 10Yonah Alexander and Joshua Sinai, Terrorism: The PLO Connection, (New York, NY: Taylor and
Francis, 1989), p. 42.
111 Kuwait, KUNA in English, January 24, 1988, in FBIS-NES, January 25, 1988, p. 10.
112Prague, CTK in English, February 8, 1988, in FBIS-NES, February 10, 1988, p. 3.
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Although the DFLP appears to be more rightist than the PFLP, the two
organizations issued a joint statement declaring Arafat's acceptance of Israel's existence as
contrary to the PNC resolutions calling for the acceptance of UN resolutions 242 and 338.
The two leaders asserted: "'Arafat's statements do not conform with the PNC resolutions
in Algiers, are not binding on the PLO in any way, and do not represent the PLO's official
policy." 113 Hawatimah also disagreed with Arafat on his decision to renounce terrorism,
dismissing the remark as Arafat's own opinion and not PLO policy. In explaining the PLO
to an interviewer, the DFLP leader stated:
The PLO is a coalition of organizations and forces that represent all the segments and
opinions of the Palestinian people. Coalitions are governed by a common program.
We are committed to that program. Any deviation from the common denominator,
any going back-,ard or jumping ahead, is not binding on the national coalitions
represented in the PLO. 114
The DFLP is therefore, not unlike the PFLP in objecting to some of Arafat's positions
while calling for unity. The disagreement with Arafat appears to be the unilateral
expression of political positions passed off as PLO policy. The two groups are only
willing to support Arafat's policies when previously approved in the democratic forum of
the PNC.
In a show of unity, Hawatimah supported Arafat in a joint proclamation in April
of 1989 that emphasized "...the importance of confronting future political developments
jointly to bolster Palestinian unity within the framework of the PLO and its bodies."'115
Several months later, Fatah and the DFLP issued a joint statement calling for "national
113Voice of the Mountain in Arabic to Lebanon, December 28, 1988, as translated in FBIS-NES,
December 29, 1988, p. 13.
114Beruit, AL-SAFIR in Arabic, March 8, 1989, as translated in FBIS-NES, March 10, 1989, p. 8.
1l5Manama, WAKH in Arabic, April 4, 1989, as translated in FBIS-NES, April 5, 1989, p. 1.
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unity in the occupied homeland" and "cohesion of all nationalist forces." 116 The intifada
thus appears to have created a conciliatory atmosphere that has fostered unity between
Fatah and the DFLP. Unity among the external leadership has been a primary reason
behind the continuing momentum of the intifada. Any spilt among the ranks would
undoubtedly drain energy from the intifada and result in factions fighting each other rather
than the common enemy.
B. THE PLO AFFILIATES
We no not have any problem with different political organizations because of our
exercise of democracy, the democracy of the revolution. I am not personally
bothered when someone differs with me or opposes me. (Arafat, Mar 14, 1988)117
Arafat has always had his enemies, but the recent moderating PLO political initiatives
have brought the critical radical factions out in force. The acts of terrorism they continue to
commit has created problems for Arafat because of their often close association with the
PLO. Arafat's credibility was called into question after his 1988 renunciation of terror,
when a Palestinian terrorist group attempted to attack an Israeli beach from the sea.
Arafat's failure to explicitly denounce the act resulted in the end of U.S.-PLO diplomatic
relations. Thus, although the organizations outside the PLO mainstream do not have any
significant following in the territories and are not represented in the UNLU, their existence
does impact on Palestinian politics and therefore deserves mention. Since the start of the
intifada, several Palestinian radical organizations (primarily based in Damascus), both PLO
affiliated and non-affiliated, have criticized Arafat's conciliatory moves. The strongest and
most frequently heard attacks have come from a PLO affiliate, the Popular Front for the
116Sanaa, Voice of Palestine in Arabic, July 6, 1989, as translated in FBIS-NES, July 7, 1989, p. 2-3.
1 17 Cairo, AL-Wafd in Arabic, March 14, 1988, p.5, as translated in FBIS-NES, March 17, 1988, p. 6.
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Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), led by Ahmed Jibril. A second
group, the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) has also created problems for Arafat and
tarnished his new moderate image. For the purpose of this paper, only these two groups
will be discussed.
1. The PFLP-GC and Ahmed Jibril
The PFLP-GC is a Syrian and Libyan funded group established in 1968 as an off-
shoot of Habash's PFLP. Although affiliated with the PLO, Jibril has not attended a PNC
meeting since 1983. The GC splintered from Habash because of a difference of opinion in
supporting Syria however, both groups carry a similar political philosophy. Both consider
the Palestinian dilemma in the greater context of revolution throughout the Arab world with
the goal of toppling conservative, pro-western governments. 118 Considered responsible
for the PLO split in 1983, Jibril has constantly attempted to challenge Arafat's leadership
position and undermine his authority. Personally, Jibril has expressed contempt for Arafat
and considers him "...a toady for the conservative oil-rich states that provide so much
funding to the PLO."119
After the PNC acceptance of UN resolutions 242 and 338, Jibril called for a state
of "mourning," echoing the Islamic stance that Palestine cannot be divided. "Palestine is
like a single human body; its land cannot be divided. ' 120 Expressing his anger over
Arafat's recognition of the "Zionist entity," Jibril called for a continuation of the armed
struggle as the only road to Palestine, asserting: "'Arafat and his supporters think they can
118Livingstone and Halevy, p.221.
119Livingstone and Halevy, p.222.
120AI-Quds Palestinian Arab Radio in Arabic, November 17, 1988, as translated in FBIS-NES,
November 18, 1988, p. 4
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get to Palestine by making concessions and kneeling to the enemies."1 21 In several other
broadcasts, Jibril has continued to deride Arafat for what he calls his "policy of
submissiveness towards Israel."1 22
The DFLP and PFLP have attempted to bring the rejectionist front back under the
PLO umbrella, but Jibril refuses to coordinate or meet with Arafat. Despite the fact that
Jibril will undoubtedly continue his Arafat bashing, in actuality, he is little more than a
minor annoyance. His organization currently holds little appeal for the occupants of the
territories, except perhaps the Islamacists who agree with his position that Palestine cannot
be divided. The limited membership of his organization (approx.400-600) prevents him
from causing any significant damage to Arafat's popularity. Minor terrorist acts against
Israel will probably be his primary menace in the future.
2. The Palestine Liberation Front and Abu Abbas
The Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) was established in 1977 as an off shoot
fiom the PFLP-GC. A pro-Iraqi terrorist organization, its headquarters are based in
Baghdad, (with a satellite in Libya until recently) and it receives financing from Iraq, Fatah
and the PLO. 123 Abu Abbas, leader of the PLF, came into Arafat's favor in 1982, when
he evacuated Beirut with the PLO, followed Arafat to Tunis, and declared his loyalty to the
PLO leader. With the fractionalization of other PLO member organizations, Arafat could
not afford to be choosy about his friends. To show his appreciation for Abbas' support,
12 1AI-Quds Palestinian Arab Radio in Arabic, December 11, 1988, as translated in FBIS-NES,
December 13, 1988, p. 4-5.
122Kuwait, Al-Ra'y Al-Amm in Arabic, September 11, 1989, p. 16, as translated in FBIS-NES,
September 14, 1989, p. 7.
123Livingstone and Halevy, p.77.
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Arafat named Abbas to the PLO Executive Committee, helped him establish the PLF
headquarters and provided him with a generous budget of $100,000 per month. 124
Although the PLF's leader Abu Abbas is an Arafat loyalist, his acts of terrorism
are not necessarily supported by the PLO. The groups' 1985 hijacking of the cruise ship
the Achille Lauro, was one incident that damaged the PLO diplomatic image Arafat was
trying to create. Although Arafat formally denied any PLO connection with Abbas, his
continuing membership in the Executive Committee could not be ignored and was glaring
proof to the internationa1 community that the PLO was indeed responsible for the Achille
Lauro incident. Arafat was forced to admit that Abbas was one of his loyal followers and
declared that the PLO " will not abandon Abu Abbas." 125 Arafat's failure to take action
against Abu Abbas was cited as the reason for U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz's
denial of a visa to address the U.N. General assembly in 1988.126
In June of 1990, Abbas once again proved to be Arafat's nemesis, as PLF
members were caut,,-: attempting a guerrilla attack on Israel from a beach landing. The
credibility of Arafat's 1988 decision to renounce terrorism was in peril as was the
continuing IJ.S.-PLO dialogue. U.S. demands that Abbas be expelled from the PLO
Executive Committee and that Arafat expressly condemn the act were ignored. The amid
strong pressures from internal political organizations and the Israeli government, the U.S.-
PLO dialogue was suspended in June of 1990 with Arafat continuing his support of Abbas.
Despite the mutual support between Arafat and Abbas, the PLF president does not
follow Arafat's political line. Arafat, realizing the potential damage an armed struggle
12 4 Livingstone and Halevy, p.77.
12 5 Livingstone and Halevy, p. 259-260.
12 6 Kuwait, AI-Oabas in Arabic, December 8, 1988, p. 19, as translated in FBIS-NES, December 12,
1988, p. 5.
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would cause to the intifada, both in terms of casualties and loss of international sympathies
for the Palestinian cause, has consistently called for the use of stones against the Israeli
forces. Abbas, in contrast, called for the Palestinians to use arms in their "...struggle
against the Zionist enemy to create a qualitative leap in the way they confront it."1 2 7
During the 19th PNC when the decision was made to accept UN resolutions 242 and 338,
Abbas stated that the PLF agrees "...to the political statement as a whole" but would not
support the two resolutions "...inasmuch as they ignore the Palestinian people's cause."'128
Abbas also refused to approve of Israeli's right to exist or to end subversive operations
against Israel.
Although Abu Abbas does not have a large following (approx. 200 members), he
has caused some problems for the moderate image Arafat has attempted to create for the
PLO. Abbas may not speak for the PLO, but his position on the Executive Committee
lends credibility to his statements and may be confused as PLO official policy. If the PLO
is to be taken seriously as a potential peace negotiator, such radical elements must be
controlled. Abbas has proven to be of little value to the PLO and more trouble than he is
worth. Although it will take a united force against him, he should be expelled from the
PLO if Arafat is to develop legitimacy in the international arena.
127Kuwait, KUNA in English, May 21, 1989, as printed in FBIS-NES, May 22, 1989, p. 9.
128Kuwait, Al-Siyasah in Arabic, December 5, 1988, p. 11, as translated in FBIS-NES, December 7,
1988, p. 2.
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IV. THE INTERNAL LEADERSHIP
While there is little doubt the uprising has created an internal leadership that has taken
responsibility for the day to day operations of the intifada, the question remains: Has an
independent leadership capable of challenging the legitimacy of the PLO, developed in the
territories or does the possibility exist for the development of one in the near future? Salim
Tamari, a professor of sociology at Birzeit University in the West Bank, in 1988, saw the
intifada as the force responsible for transferring political power from the PLO to the internal
movement. 129 Author Emile Sahliyeh claimed the uprising has given the Palestinians in the
occupied territories a greater political role in the Palestinian nationalist movement and
"...shifted the locus of struggle and leadership for the promotion of the Palestinian cause
from the exiled PLO to the inhabitants of the occupied territories."1 30 While the internal
leadership has undeniably become a political force in the Palestinian nationalist movement,
the PLO and Yasir Arafat are still considered the symbols of Palestinian national rights.
The Palestinian uprising requires the recognized legitimacy of the PLO organ while the
PLO needs the support of the masses to maintain its legitimacy. Thus, while the uprising
has given greater prestige to the PLO, it has not been without its costs. The PLO can no
longer act solely within the political vacuum of the PNC. If Arafat's PLO falls out of touch
with the mainstream political movement in the territories, the possibility for a challenge of
leadership exists. The PLO's failure to make any progress towards the establishment of a
Palestinian state, have already affected the politics of the West Bank and Gaza residents.
129Salim Tamari, "What the Uprising Means," in Middle East Report, (May-June, 1988) p. 27.
130 Sahliyeh, p. 183.
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To understand the groups that may challenge Arafat's authority in the future, the internal
political forces in the territories must be studied.
It was the initiatives taken by the youth of the territories, not the PLO, that ignited the
fire inspiring all age groups to participate in political protest activities against the occupation
authorities. And it was the leadership of the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising
that created the organization needed to perpetuate the intifada. The Islamic groups have
also taken responsibility for inciting the masses, but their influence is concentrated
primarily in the refugee camps of the Gaza strip. A third group that must be considered
when discussing the internal leadership, are the notables who are often sought out by the
media for their perspective on the uprising. These three groups have influence the intifada
to a greater or lesser degree. They are the formal political structure of the occupied
territories and therefore will each be explored with particular attention given to their relative
power position within the territories and their relationships with the PLO.
A. THE UNIFIED NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE UPRISING
The birth of the Unified National Command of the Uprising brought to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict a breed of leaders that was quite unprecedented. Raised in the
shadow of Israel's occupation, they had only vague memories of what life had been
like before it. Diplomacy and intercession with the authorities, the hallmarks of their
predecessors for the past two decades, were simply not their style. 131
The Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU - renamed from the Unified
National Command of the Uprising), first appeared shortly after the beginning of the
uprising. Although not considered a party to the initiation of the uprising, the UNLU can
be credited with organizing and directing the civil disobedience that continues to
characterize the uprising. On January 19, 1988, the first call for a general strike went out
13 1Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Intifada the Palestinian Uprising: Israel's Third Front, (New York,
N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1990), p. 188.
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over Al-Quds Palestinian radio, a Clandestine station believed to be broadcasting from
Lebanon possibly under the control of the PFLP-GC. The broadcast praised the people of
the uprising, encouraged escalation of anti-Israeli activities and called for a general,
comprehensive strike commencing on the day of the broadcast and continuing for four
days. 132 One day later the Baghdad Voice of the PLO also praised the uprising and
encouraged the people to continue. The broadcast also welcomed members of the Islamic
al-Jihad movement into the UNLU. 133 Control over events of the uprising were initially
attempted through the distribution a leaflets, a method that later proved to be quite effective
in inciting mass civil disobedie,.,,. The Jerusalem Television Service considered the
distribution of the leaflets to be an attempt to "...paralyze life in the territories
completely."1 34 Civilian Administrators in the territories also noted the existence of the
UNLU and correctly pegged its leaders as PLO supporters.
In late January, a group calling itself the Uprising's Popular Committee in the city of
Qalqilyah, broadcast on al-Quds radio the strike rules accompanied b) a warning to
merchants who do not comply that "...we will strike with a fist of iron...Anyone who
repeats such acts [ignoring strike calls] will be met with an immediate response and without
previous warning, beginning with the capital until the entire store is set on fire." 135 In
early February, al-Quds radio called on the people of the territories to observe calls for
132AI-Quds Palestinian Arab Radio in Arabic, January 19, 1988, as translated in FBIS-NES, January
10, 1988, p. 5.
133Baghdad, Voice of the PLO in Arabic, January 20, 1988, as translated in FBIS-NES, January 21,
1988, p. 6-7.
134Jerusalem Television Service in Hebrew, January 19, 1988, as translated in FBIS-NES, January 21,
1988, p. 29.
135AL-Quds Palestinian Arab Radio in Arabic, January 26, 1988, as translated in FBIS-NES, January
27, 1988, p. 8.
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demonstrations and strikes, threatening anyone who failed to comply. 136 Another
broadcast on al-Quds radio in mid-February outlined the uprising "program," supposedly
approved by all trade unions, professional organizations, unified committees and uprising
leaders, but without a given source. The broadcast outlined specific responsibilities of each
group of people including the PLO whose job it was to "...avenge the martyrs."'137 In
contrast to the Al-Quds station, the Voice of the PLO presented a broadcast in the same time
period, under the name of the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising, that
emphasized the role of the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian
people. 138 It is clear that the PLO had no control over the al-Quds station and was
attempting to use its own broadcasts to influence the wave of the intifada and to remind the
people of the territories who their legitimate leader was. It thus appears the development of
a coordinated leadership responsible for controlling the events of the uprising did not
hap, n imrnediately at the onset of the uprising.
The UNLU was the leadership that eventually took command of the uprising. This
internal leadership organization is composed of representatives of each of several PLO
factions including the PFLP, DFLP, Fatah and the Palestinian Communist Party. As in the
external PLO, Fatah dominates in the territories and in the UNLU. Although it is unclear
exactly who is directing the uprising, the need to know the identity of the leaders may be
less important than determining the scope of their control over events of the uprising.
Because of the Israeli government's policy of arresting anyone suspected of membership in
136AI-Quds Palestinian Arab Radio in Arabic, February 5, 1988, as translated in FBIS-NES, February
6, 1988, p. 5.
137Ai-Quds Palestinian Arab Radio in Arabic, February 16, 19;, as translated in FBIS-NES, February
17, 1988, p. 4-5.
138 Baghdad, Voice of the PLO in Araoic, February 4, 1988, as translated in FBIS-NES, February 5,
1988, p. 3.
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the UNLU, and the extensive Israeli intelligence network in the territories, it is highly likely
that many previous members of the UNLU have been arrested. The survivability of the
UNLU appears to be hinged on its ability to replace leaders as they are arrested. As
prominent West Bank resident Hanna Sinyurah noted:
This generation is made up of anonymous leaders who lack substantial identity,
coming from the trade unions, the universities, and the municipal sector. If you
detain 10 of them another 100 will replace them. 139
If Sinyurah is correct, there is no one leader or group of leaders needed to sustain the
intifada. Without the existence of individual personalities, it is difficult to even consider the
UNLU as a leadership challenge to the PLO. The actual "minds" behind the uprising may
be nothing more than cogs in a wheel. If the leadership can be so easily replaced, then it
stands to reason that the UNLU is controlled by prevailing political conditions and possibly
the desires of the PLO. Decapitating such an "assembly line" leadership is therefore
impossible, for the "leaders" can readily be replaced by anyone capable of continuing with
the political program of the uprising.
Authors Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari have theorized that if the masses knew the
identity of those who give the orders of the intifada, support could be lost. The two
authors attributed the attempts of UNLU members to remain anonymous even after arrest,
to their fears of the potential constituent response if they knew that in reality, they were just
average Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza. Knowledge of who the actual leaders
were, they assert, might undermine their authority in the territories and put an end to the
"blind obedience" to UNLU directives. 140 Such a view considers the legitimacy of the
139 Tel Aviv, Yedi-ot Aharonot in Hebrew, January 15, 1988, p. 5, as translated in FBIS-NES, January
21 1988, p. 7.
14 0Schiff and Ya'ari, p. 190.
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UNLU to be embodied in the prestige of the individuals rather than in the respect for the
organization that has perpetuated the uprising and given a renewed sense of hope and pride
to the people of the territories. Universal participation in the intifada appears to stem from
the belief that the uprising will be the impetus needed to throw off the occupation and create
a Palestinian state. If particular individuals were the controlling force behind the intifada,
then their arrest and deportation would mean an end to the uprising. The sustainability of
the uprising can therefore be attributed to the ability of the UNLU to replace lost leaders
and the commitment of the people who believe in their cause.
The elements that comprise the leadership of the UNLU are perhaps younger and more
revolutionary in their rhetoric than the traditional leaders of West Bank politics, but are no
less zealous in the pursuit of their goals. In attempting to characterize the internal
leadership, author Don Peretz explains: "...it is assumed to be young, well educated, not
tied to the traditionalists or notables, and closely linked to the extensive social
communication networks existing among Palestinians."' 14 1 This new generation of leaders
is more determined to end the occupation and more willing to sacrifice what ever it takes to
achieve this goal. They do not fear the Israeli soldiers, but rather defy their authority and
dare them to react. As Hana Sinyurah, a prominent West Bank resident stated:
Our generation was afraid to speak out. I was afraid to speak out loudly and clearly.
They are not afraid. 142
Although the PLO is considered the political representative of the Palestinians, the
UNLU appears to have its own political agenda. While taking responsibility for directing
the day to day activities of the intifada, the National Leadership has also injected politics
14 1Don Peretz, "Intifadeh: The Palestinian Uprising," in Foreign Affairs, (Summer, 1988), p. 969.
14 2 Tel Aviv, Yedi-ot Aharonot, January 15, 1988, p. 5, as translated in FBIS-NES, January 21, 1988,
p. 32.
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into its radio broadcasts in the territories. In July of 1988 when King Hussein decided to
sever his contacts with the West Bank, the UNLU praised the decision as "...one of the
most important achievements of the uprising.' 143 In October of the same year, prior to
Arafat's address to the UN, the National Leadership called on the PNC to adopt an
"...explicit political program that will endorse the establishment of a just peace that will not
be achieved unless a Palestinian state is established." 144 The PNC's decision to accept UN
resolutions 242 and 338, reflects the significant political influence of the UNLU. Arafat's
declaration of an independent Palestinian state by the PNC in November of 1988, was met
with high praise from the UNLU. Arafat's move was an obvious attempt to assert his
authority over the territories and to institutionalize his legitimacy as president of a
Palestinian state, however, such a bold political move could not have been made without
the support of the UNLU. Thus, although the National Leadership does appear to have a
political agenda, it is not one that contradicts the PLO. The UNLU however, has not been
timid about expressing its desires. In May of 1989, the UNLU's reference to itself as "the
struggle arm and political extension of the PLO in the State of Palestine," 14 5 clearly
expressed an involvement in the politics of the Palestinian cause.
Although the PLO approves the leaflets the UNLU distributes in the territories
directing the activities of the intifada, the internal leadership's statements do not always
parallel those of the PLO. One example was the leadership's declaration that "...not a
single national Palestinian should be meeting with anyone in the Israeli government," when
143Baghdad, Voice of the PLO in Arabic, September 5, 1988, as translated in FBIS-NES, September 6,
1988, p. 5.
144Paris, Radio Monte Carlo in Arabic, October 30, 1988, as translated in FBIS-NES, November 2,
1988, p. 18.
14 5 Sanaa, Voice of Palestine in Arabic, May 23, 1989, as translated in FBIS-NES, May 24, 1989, p.
15.
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Arafat had already approved of such meetings. 146 The geographical distance between the
two and the limited communications, complicated by Israeli censorship and control, may
account for the discrepancies. Having two leadership organizations involved in declaring
political positions, further complicates the relationship. If the PLO finds itself no longer
able, for whatever reason, to represent the expressed desires of the internal leadership, then
the result may mean an end to the the PLO's legitimacy. For now however, the uprising
appears to have strengthened the relationship between the Palestinians in the Occupied
Territories and the external PLO.
The objectives of the UNLU have primarily been to incite the people, through
revolutionary rhetoric and calls to civil disobedience and violent action, to sustain the
uprising until political goals are achieved. Leaflets containing calls for general strikes,
escalation of violent activities, and non-payment of taxes, have been the primary method of
control over the intifada. The UNLU coordinates individual neighborhood activities
through informal branches in refugee districts, villages and city neighborhoods. Local
leaders tend to reflect the predominant political affiliations of their particular areas. For
example, the Islamic Jihad is represented in Gaza and in Nablus, the village "higher
committee" consists primarily of local Fatah leadership. While the local leadership is
responsible for ensuring the instructions of the UNLU leaflets are carried out, they are
often modified to fit local conditions.1 47 The al-shabibah youth movement, started by the
PLO, and the strike forces have, been the two groups responsible for physically enforcing
the general strikes and initiating stone throwing acts against Israeli settlers and soldiers.
The often over zealous youths have also been blamed for the killing of suspected
146Joel Brinkley, "Inside the Intifada," in The New York Times Magazine, (October 30, 1989), p. 92.
147 joe Stork, "The Significance of Stones: Notes from the Seventh Month," in Middle East Report
(September-October, 1988), p. 7.
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collaborators. Despite the fact that the al-shabibah and strike forces are under the control of
the UNLU, the daily acts ,'.., ar... : .. d y .oordinated with the, top internal
leadership.
Dr. Mohammad Hallaj, call the shabibah the "backbone support of the intifada."'148
The al-shabibah youth movement, has often been characterized in less flattering ways by
Israeli sources. Responsible for maintaining the momentum of the intifada, the youngsters
are guided by more seasoned veterans who are often graduates of Israeli's detention centers
or the "University of the Intifada," as they have been commonly called. The attacks,
according to one source, are usually on selective targets, demonstrating a keen knowledge
of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), where and when they are most vulnerable. 149 Since
the beginning of the intifada, attacks have decreased somewhat, but selectivity of targets
and carefully planned escape routes have increased the effectiveness of the calculated stone
throwing and decreased the number of arrests on attackers.
In a rather in-depth series of articles on the intifada in 1989, The New York Times
presented a portrait of the uprising and its principle participants. In his article "Inside the
Intifada," author Joel Brinkley depicts the attacks of one particular community youth group
as calculated and organized against a specific target. 150 With the black and white
khaffiyehs that have become their symbol, wrapped around their faces, the shabibah,
when not engaged in acts of violence, are responsible for spreading the wave of
nationalism by unfurling Palestinians flags and painting nationalist slogans on buildings,
particularly when the UNLU calls for waving Palestinian flags. According to Brinkley, the
14 8 Author's interview on September 24, 1990.
14 9Tel Aviv, Yedi'ot Aharonot in Hebrew, article by Ron Ben-Yishay, "Intifada at a Crossroads," pp. 6,
7, 18, as translated in FBIS-NES, July 6, 1988, p. 27.
15 01Brinkley, "Inside the Intifada," pp. 36, 38.
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shabibah is organized locally within each village and its level of activity depends on the
availability of targets. Rural areas isolated from roads travelled by Israeli settlers and
soldiers are less likely to have an active shabibah movement than would a large city. Local
shabibah, although acting independently, do consult with the leadership contact person
active in the nearest large town. Such an organizational structure ensures the continued
perpetration of the intifada and enables coordination of activities to some degree.
The popular committees of the uprising have enabled the civil disobedience phase to
continue through providing the assistance and support services needed for the residents of
the territories to survive the hardships of the intifada. The committees are the skeleton of
the uprising and represent an attempt to develop a separate institutional infrastructure that
circumvents the established Israeli civil administration. The committees have generated
mass invol ement of the population in supporting the intifada and have fostered a spirit of
community cooperation that has helped ensure the continuation of the struggle. The main
committees are: the health committee, responsible for treating demonstration casualties and
providing first aid teams for on sight treatment; the food supply committee, primarily aimed
at providing food for residents of refugee camps under curfew; the educational committee,
organized to ensure the educational needs of students on strike were met; the merchant's
committee, initiated to replace the pro-Jordanian Chambers of Commerce; and the striking
committee or strike force, responsible for control over daily affairs. 15 1 Agricultural
committees have also been organized to distribute seeds and encourage the cultivation of
individual gardens. Self-reliance and independence from the Israeli economy and
government have been the goals of the popular committees.
15 1Tel Aviv, 'Al Hamishmar in Hebrew, May 2, 1988, p.7, as translated in FBIS-NES, May 6, 1988,
p. 32-33.
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Although the Palestinians understand the reality of reliance on the Israeli economy and
the impossibility of complete disengagement from that economy anytime in the near future,
the committees have been reasonably successful in developing increased self-sufficiency
within the territories and impacting the Israeli economy through organized strikes and
boycott of Israeli goods. Israeli control over water supplies and electricity are one reason
for the inability of the territories to gain total independence. Another is the large number of
Palestinians employed in the Israeli labour market. The figures do however, demonstrate
the success of the boycott in developing independence from Israeli made products. Prior to
the uprising, Israeli exports to the territories reached the $850,000 mark per annum,
making the territories the second largest importer of Israeli goods. By February of 1989,
after a concentrated effort by the popular committees to rid the Palestinian market of all
Israeli goods where a substitute was available, the Israeli trade figures showed a drop in the
trade surplus of goods and services exported to the West Bank and Gaza of two-thirds
compared to the previous year. 152
The strike forces are, according to one Israeli source, "...groups of thugs who are
meant to impose the will of the "popular committees" on the population by force, with the
help of firebombs..."' 153 Such a characterization demonstrates the lack of restraint the
strike forces have shown in their often violent activities. Responsible for enforcing strikes
and breaking the network of collaborators, the strike force is the police arm of the popular
committees. In one communique to the territories, the popular and national committees
warned that the strike forces would "...deal with any violation of the national program of
15 2 Sally Ramsden, "The Roots of Revolution," in The Middle Fast, (April, 1989) p. 24.
15 3Tel Aviv, Yedi'ot Aharonot in Hebrew, article by Ron Ben-Yishay: "intifada at a Crossroads," July
1, 1988, pp. 6, 7, 18, as translated in FBIS-NES, July 6, 1988, p. 26.
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the uprising." 154 An Israeli source considered the strike forces a kind of "national
resistance group" that constitutes "...the organizational, operational, and ideological
infrastructure of a future popular Palestinian army ....1 155 Not unlike the al-shabibah, the
strike forces are also responsible for maintaining the "dynamics" of the intifada events.
The strike forces appear to have their own structured leadership hierarchy. The forces
are divided up into neighborhood cells which are further subdivided into and units each
with its own internal command structure.156 The strike forces are much more militant then
the other committees and have a strict disciplinary code for its members who must be at
least 15 years old. The strike forces appear to be more organized than the top leadership of
the UNLU and have been gaining power though terrorist actions and the killing of
collaborators. Despite repeated calls from the PLO and the UNLU to ensure collaborators
are given an opportunity to be heard and their guilt or innocence determined by the
committees set up for that purpose, the torture and killing of suspected collaborators
continues to be a problem. An article in July of 1990 in The Los Angeles Times reported
that 230 suspected collaborators or more than one-quarter of the entire number of
Palestinian's killed in violence associated with the intifada, were Palestinian's accused of
collaborating with the enemy. 157
154 AI-Quds Palestinian Arab Radio in Arabic, December 21, 1988, as translated in FBIS-NES,
December 22, 1988, p. 8.
15 5Tel Aviv, Ma'ariv in Hebrew, August 25, 1988, p. A3, as translated in FBIS-NES, August 26,
1988, p. 23.
15 6Tel Aviv, M1'jy in Hebrew, August 25, 1988, p. A3, as translated in FBIS-NES, August 26,
1988, p. 24.
S07; ,s "Palestinian Intifada: Hints of Failure Amid Growing Discontent," in The Los
Angeles Times., (July 22, 1990), p. A8.
70
In August of 1988, Israel formally outlawed the committees and began arresting and
often deporting anyone thought to be affiliated with a popular committee. 158 Such an
action, however, did not deter the committee members from continuing their work. As one
West Bank resident stated:
Almost everyone I know takes part in some aspect of the work carried out through the
local committees.. .They can't put a whole population in prison and anyway,...there's
a good chance of ending up on the wrong side of an Israeli gun, baton or jail sooner
or later, no matter what we do or don't do .... 159
The UNLIJ, while it can be considered the primary force in controlling the internal
intifada, does not have full control over the individual committees and command structures
that coordinate activities in individual villages and cities. The UNLU does however, set the
general policy guidelines that direct the activities of the intifada. Because of its unique
character with the inclusion of both the left, the right, and the r-oderate elements, the
UNLU provides mass appeal and has therefore gained legitimacy as an organized
leadership body. The popular committees, although seemingly loyal to the UNLU, tend to
inject flexibility into the UNLU's program, attempting to adapt the UNLU's program to
their individual community needs and limitations. The strike forces appear to be the one
organization that exists, to a certain degree, outside the control of the UNLU. Although
helping to enforce the "rules" of the intifada, the strike forces have, in the past, acted
independently. The development of such a militant, organized, underground police
structure could, in the near future, create a challenge to both Israeli as well as Palestinian
authority.
15 8
"Israel Outlaws Local Panels Behind Arab Uprising," in The New York Times, (August 19, 1988),
p. A3.
159 Ramsden, p. 23.
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B. THE NOTABLES
There are several personalities in the territories who are recognized as spokespersons
for the Palestinians in the occupied territories. They are often considered moderates and are
used as a source of information by the Israeli government and the international media. The
notables can be divided into three categories: pro-PLO, pro-Jordan, and those who support
both the PLO and Jordan. 160 Since Jordan severed links with the West Bank in July of
1988, the pro-Jordan and even the split camp has lost popularity and legitimacy in
representing the views of the Palestinian people. The primary role of the notables has been
to "...meet with foreign officials and visiting dignitaries, to convey to them the 'position of
the Palestinians' regarding a political settlement. ' 161 The PLO however, has recently
curtailed the role of the pro-PLO notables in meeting with foreign representatives, possibly
in response to Palestinian outcries that only the PLO can represent the Palestinian cause.
One of the most prominent and often interviewed of the pro-PLO notables in the West
Bank is Faysal al-Husayni. Since the beginning of the intifada, al-Husayni has supported
the PLO as the legitimate leader of the Palestinians and the uprising and has emphasized the
lack of any independent leadership in the territories. Although al-Husayni has often spoken
to Israeli officials, it has always been with the approval of the PLO. When questioned in
February of 1989 about the possibility of an Israeli attempt to develop an independent
leadership through such meetings, al-Husayni replied: "We cannot and will not accept
under any circumstances our becoming an alternative to the leadership of the Palestinian
people either inside or in the diaspora-that is, the PLO."' 62 While al-Husayni claims all
160 Ziad Abu -Amr, "Notes on Palestinian Political Leadership," in Middle East Reort, (September-
October, 1988), p. 24.
16 1Abu-Amr, p. 24.
16 2 London, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat in Arabic, February 18, 1989, p.3, as translated in FBIS-NES, February
24, 1989, p. 6.
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Palestinians are members of the PLO and he himself has "ties" with the organization, he
does not admit to being the PLO's representative, but rather declares himself a
representative of the Palestinian position. 163 Such a statement would imply he does indeed
represent the PLO, since the PLO represents the Palestinian position.
Although al-Husayni has consistently followed the PLO political line, in January of
1989 he was criticized by the PLO and local Palestinians for endorsing the Israeli plan for
elections in the territories. Realizing his error, al-Husayni clarified the statement and
brought it into line with PLO policy by adding the elections would only be acceptable after
Israeli withdrawal from the territories. The Israeli media attributed the strong PLO criticism
to Arafat's fear that al-Husayni's moderate initial position would further Israeli attempts to
develop an independent leadership in the territories.164 Al-Husayni does not have the
political legitimacy among the masses to express policy contradictory to that of the PLO.
He also lacks the legitimacy to represent the Palestinians in peace negotiations with the
Israeli government. Such a position prevents him from wielding any real power in the
territories, but his reputation for being a moderate among Palestinians has opened many
doors and allowed him access to many different groups who are willing to listen to al-
Husayni's "straight talk" of the Palestinian dilemma. In April of 1989, he traveled to the
U.S. to speak to several groups about the Palestinian political position, all the while
emphasizing the impossibility of developing an independent internal leadership. 165
16 3Tel Aviv, Dvar in Hebrew, January 5, 1990, pp. 4,5, as translated in FBIS-NES, January 5, 1990,
p. 22.
1 64 Jerusalem, The Jerusalem Post, January 31, 1989, p. 1, as translated in FBIS-NES, January 31,
1989, p. 24.
165 London, Al-SharQ AI-Awsat in Arabic, April 8, 1989, p. 3, as translated in FBIS-NES, April 18,
1989, p. 7.
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Fayiz Abu-Rahmah, a prominent lawyer from Gaza and political notable, also
understands the prominence of the PLO as the only legitimate representative of the
Palestinian cause.
The PLO has the mandate.. .it can make concessions without being accused of being a
traitor as an ordinary person who does not have the mandate and who may make
political concessions on behalf of the Palestinians. So it is beneficial for the peace
process to have a party with a full mandate from the (Palestinian) population. And
the only one in the Palestinian field is the PLO. 166
In assessing the UNLU, he considered the leadership as loyal to the PLO and fully
connected with the external leadership on political policy.
One of the most outspoken pro-PLO notables in the Occupied Territories is Hanna
Sinyurah, editor of A.lEFj Palestinian newspaper. More actively involved in the intifada
than other notables, Sinyurah initiated the campaign to boycott Israeli products. His
position of prominence among the intifada leaders was demonstrated when he was given a
letter from the UNLU containing a list of Palestinian demands to present to UN Under
Secretary Marrack Goulding. 167
Although supportive of the PLO position and declared an "agent of the PLO" by Israeli
Defense Minister Rabin, Sinyurah, like al-Husayni, deijies being a PLO representative. 168
After the November 1988 PNC decision to accept resolutions 242 and 338, Sinyurah
declared the move "...the triumph of the voice of reason and moderation, as well as
16 6Amman, Jordan Times in English, March 21, 1990, p. 5, as presented in FBIS-NES, March 21,
1990, p. 8.
16 7Tel Aviv, 'Al Hnimar in Hebrew, July 21, 1988, p.6, as translated in FBIS-NES, July 22, 1988,
p. 30.
168Tel Aviv, Yedi-ot Aharonot in Hebrew, January 15, 1988, p. 5, as translated in FBIS-NES, January
21, 1988, p. 32.
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democracy and a forceful drive to build up momentum for a peace process in the next few
months."169
The power of each of these pro-PLO leaders exists in the support they receive from the
PLO. As one author stated: "They have not come to their position through expression of
popular will .... " 170 The PLO undoubtedly approved of the 1988 meetings between
Sinyurah and Rahmah and U.S. Secretary of State, George Schultz. These notables do
appear to represent the views of the PLO, but refuse to be directly affiliated with Arafat.
Perhaps too close of an affiliation with Arafat would mean the end to their reputation for
being moderates and an end to one of the few PLO publicity instruments acceptable to
Western ears. The undeniable fact that their legitimacy exists through the continuing
support of the PLO, ensures .- y will ot " a.iy significant leadership challcnge to tihe
PLO's authority. Their willingness to talk to Israeli authorities has earned them the
reputation of being traitors among local Palestinians who consider the PLO their only
legitimate representative. Their exclusive identification with Fatah also limits their
legitimacy as political figures. Failure to accurately represent each of the primary political
forces in the territories further limits their positions as leaders.
C. THE ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS
In 1979, after the Ayatollah's political victory in Iran, Islamic fundamentalism
throughout the Middle East began to rise in popularity. The goal of such groups was to
establish an Islamic state and an Islamic society based on the principles of the Koran. The
growing Islamic fervor, bordering on fanaticism, was a reaction to western control and a
16 9 Jerusalem, Al-Fai, November 21, 1988, p. 16, as translated in FBIS-NES, November 23, 1988,
p. 35.
17 0 Abu 'Amr, p. 25.
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counterforce against western influences. Although not initially a political force in the
territories, after 1980, the fundamental Muslims began to take a more active role in
confronting Israeli occupation. 17 1 The success of the Shi'i Muslims in Lebanon in 1982
further fueled political activism among the Islamicists. The loss of PLO prestige after
Arafat's expulsion from Lebanon and the subsequent fractionalization of PLO member
groups, shattered confidence in the military solution and increased support for the Islamic
camp. Despite this growth in popularity, the Islamic movement was not heavily involved
in resisting the occupation until the intifada.
Although a point of contention among Palestinian nationalists, the Muslim
fundamentalists take credit for initiating the uprising in the Gaza Strip. The two active
Islamic groups are the Islamic Jihad and Hamas, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood
established specifically for dealing with the intifada. Ideologically, both grours are
opposed to the secular position of the nationalists and have expressly disavowed the PLO's
support of the two state solution. Despite repeated attempts by the UNLU and PLO to
integrate the leaders of the religious factions into the mainstream leadership, the Islamic
groups have chosen to remain independent. Of the two groups, Hamas has the greatest
following and is more politically involved in the intifada than the Islamic Jihad. Although
most sources consider the Islamic movements of minor consequence as a potential
leadership force in the territories, their growing popularity warrants a closer look.
1. The Islamic Jihad
The Islamic Jihad movement is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood and is
considered "...the most radical, violent, and innovative of the Islamic organizations."1 72
17 1Robert Satloff, "Islam in the Palestinian Uprising," in Qrbi, (Summer 1989), p. 391.
17 2 Satloff, p. 393.
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The Islamic Jihad gained notoriety after six members escaped from a Gaza Central Prison,
killing the commander of the military police in Gaza in August of 1987. Several other
Jihad killings of Israeli citizens are considered one cause for the escalation of violent
protests that preceded and bled into the uprising. 173 Once the intifada began, the Jihad
leaders were extremely active in fueling its continuance. The heavy hand of the Israeli
authorities however, quickly decapitated the Jihad's leadership and "...prevented the Jihad
from attaining more tangible influence among the masses, despite the clear sympathy that
the Jihad Movement had won.' 174
In January of 1989, an identified leader of the Islamic Jihad expressed the goals of
the movement in contrast to those of the Muslim Brotherhood:
...we want to free the land only by force. We aspire to change the whole world and
in turn convert it to Islam with the help of weapons and to kill all infidels, including
the Zionist Jews. 175
The Islamic Jihad maintains an extreme position, refusi:ig to consider giving Lp any piece
of the homeland and pledging to continue the armed struggle until Islam triumphs and rules
over the entire state of Palestine. Demonstrating their sincerity to continue the armed
struggle, the Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for a bus attack in July of 1989 where 17
Israelis were killed and 27 wounded. The organizations leaders emphasized their
conviction that armed struggle is "the only way to liberate Palestine."'176
173Dr. Ziyad Abu-'Aniru and 'Akko al-Aswar, The Islamic Movement in the 'Vest Bank and Gaza Strip
i Arabic. July 1989, pp. 1-183, as translated in FBIS-NI2S, June 14, 1990, p. 52.
174 Au-'Amru and al-Asar, p. 55.
17 Tel Aviv, HA-ARETZ in Hebrew, January 20, 1988, pp. 2,4, as ira slated in FBIS-NES. January
,19 9, p. 8.
17fvTehran IDomest Service in Persian, July 13, 1()89 as translated in FBIS-NES. July 14, 1989, p 8.
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achieve a peaceful solution, asserting the only solution to the Palestinian problem is a holy
war. The covenant also forbade anyone to "...yield or concede part or all of it
[Palestine]. ' ' 80 Although critical of the PLO's secularism, the charter says that Hamas
"...considers the PLO to be the closest to the Islamic Resistance Movement and regards it
as a father or brother, or a relative or iend." 181 The Islamic movement however, cannot
support the PLO until it embraces Islam as the foundation of its political ideology.
Not unlike the Islamic Jihad movement, Hamas also believes the whole of
Palestine must be returned to the Palestinians. Hamas leaders oppose the PLO on secular
ground- and because "...it is an organization that does not serve God."'182 Hamas also
opposes PLO attempts at diplomacy under an international conference and any direct
negotiations with the "Zionist enemy." After the PNC decision to accept resolutions 242
and 338, Hamas leaders called the proclamation an "...act of heresy [that] entails the
concession of large areas of Palestine soil. "183
Throughout the uprising, Hamas has remained outside of the mainstream
leadership. In contrast to the UNLU's call for an inteinational conference and the
establishment of an independent Palestinian state, the Brotherhood has called for the
establishment of an Islamic state in all of Palestine. In an e, ,'rt to assert its independence
from the larger UNLU leadership, Hamas has issued its own strike calls on days of
religious significance. The strikes have been largely ignored in the West Bank but
18 0)John Kifner, "Islamic Fundamentalist Group Splitting Palestinian Uprising," in The New York
Times. (September 18, 1988), p. Al.
18 t Abu-Amru and al-Aswar, p. 40.
181Abu-'Amru and al-Aswar, p. 19.
183 Tel Aviv. Ha'[z in Hebrew, November 22, 1988, p. 4. as translated in FBIS-NES, November 23,
1988, p. 36.
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Although in disagreement with the PLO over its secular approach, Islamic Jihad
leaders identify somewhat with Fatah whose ieaders share an islamic background.
Although often critical of Fatah, the Jihad will not fight against the forces that fight against
the occupation. "The Jihad is anxious not to clash with any other Palestinian force,
whether Islamic or secular, and believes that the battlefield is wide enough for all."1 77
Despite the Jihad's refusal to join the UNLU, there has been limited operational
coordination with Fatah members since the start of the intifada. The PNC resilutions of
1988 however, ended any sign of truce between the two groups as the Islamic Jihad
condemned Arafat's declarations.
The arrest and deportation of many Jihad leaders after the start of the intifada ha,
significantly decreased its presence in the territories and therefore, limited its positicn as a
possible threat to the PLO le;.dership. The continuing aggressive efforts by Israeli
intelligence to identify and arrest members of the Jihad have forced the movement
underground and thus limited its opportunity for recruitment and expansion in the
territories. 178 Its primary future influences may well be those derived from its early effects
of rousing political activism among the Palestinian youth.
2. Hamas
Hamas, an acronym for the al-Harakat dl-Muqawwama al-Islamiyya or Islamic
Resistance Movement, was organized as a political element of the Egyptian originated
Muslim Brotherhood for the express purpose of supporting the intifada. 179 In 1988, the
new Islamic organization issued a 40 page covenant explaining its political ideology with
regard to the Palestinian dilemma. The document rejects outright any PLO efforts to




followed in the more fundamental Gaza Strip. As a result of the strike calls, Fatah leaders
have accused Hamas of attempting to divide the people of the territories and have called on
the Palestinians to ignore Hamas strike calls which have only furthered the sufferings of the
people. 184 Hamas has nonetheless continued the strike calls and has had little trouble
maintaining support in the Gaza strip.
In March of this year, Hamas sent a memo to Arafat reaffirming its position on
cooperation and coordination among the various Palestinian forces and emphasizing its
adherence to the PLO leadership. 185 Less than two week later however, Hamas refused to
join the UNLU because of political differences and declared that the PNC resolutions were
not binding on Hamas. 186 After an offer to join the PLO's parliament, Hamas demanded
40 percent of the total number of PNC seats as one condition for agreeing to follow the
mainstream Palestinian leadership. Hamas leaders also reportedly agreed to join the PNC
on a smaller scale if the committee agreed to abandon the PLO peace strategy and the two
state proposal" 87 Repeated attempts by the PLO to bring Hamas into the PNC have failed
thus far . Although its leaders espouse unity among the factions, they themselves are
unwilling to fall in line with the mainstream.
184Paris, Radio Monte Carlo in Arabic, February 3, 1989, as translated in FBIS-NES, February 3,
1989, p. 8.
18 5 Dubayy, AI-Bayan in Arabic, March 3, 1990, p. 12, as translated in FBIS-NES, March 5, 1990,
p. 2-3.
18 6Jcrusalem Television Service in Arabic, March 8, 1990, as translated in FBIS-NES, March 12, 1990,
p. 5.
187Amman, Jordan Times in Arabic, April 10, 1990, p. 1, as translated in FBIS-NES, April 11, 1990,
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Despite their growing popularity, in March of 1990, Ab,-Rahmah estimated that
Hanias represented no more than 15 per cent of the Gaza population. 188 The large number
of Palestinians adhering to its called strike days however, indicates a larger following.
Hamas' popularity is limited by its inability to support the nationalist movement whose
position has been secured by the over 20 years of direct involvement in the Palestinian
cause compared to the few years of Hamas' existence as a force in the territories. The
support for strike days in the territories, and the Gaza strip in particular, may be more an
indication of support and respect for the tenants of Islam than support for the politics of
Hamas. One reason for Hamas' lack of support in the territories, is its lost credibility in the
territories resulting from the continuing relations of its parent organization with certain Arab
regimes and the establishment of leaders and branch organizations in Western countries. 189
Despite Hamas' minimal influence in the territories, the political failure of the PLO
to achieve any significant progress towards obtaining a Palestinian state, may improve
Hamas' popularity. The inability of the secular nationalist moderate approach to i-'hieve a
peaceful solution will, no doubt, inject the more radical elements with a new sense of
purpose. The Islamic solution of jihad or holy war, to reclaim all of Palestine, may appear
the best solution after moderation has failed. Before Hamas can become a significant
political influence in the territories, however, it will require clearly defined political
objectives and the presence of a charismatic leaders which thus far, it has failed to produce.
Breaking the secular bonds will not be an easy task, however, the right combinatiun of
PLO failure and Islamic organization and leadership may be enough to inspire a significant
following to bear arms and take up tue jihad. In the short run, however, the Islamic groups
1
"Arnman, Jordan Times in English, March 21, 1990, p. 5, as printed in FBIS-NES, March 21, 1990,
p. 8.
189Abu-'Amru and aI-A',war, p. 66.
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will probably be nothing more than a nuisance as they remain the one force outside of the
mainstream internal leadership. Increasing their base of support will fuel dissension among
internal leaders and divert energy away from the uprising. A greater following will also
result in a greater influence in the peace process and a possible sharing of political
authority. As author Robert Satloff stated: "A more immediate fear is that the Islamic trend
may grow strong enough to acquire a veto over the emerging political process."'190 Such
political power for the Islamicists would ensure the death of moderation.
190Satloff, p. 400.
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V. THE GULF CRISIS AND THE INTIFADA
A. ARAFAT AND HUSSEIN
Saddam Hussein has long been a financial and political supporter of the Palestinian
cause. In February of 1988, the Iraqi government pledged $13 million in aid to the
Palestinians in the territories as a symbol of "...the Iraqi people's solidarity with the
fraternal Palestinian people."' 191 During the Arab Summit meeting in May of this year,
Hussein brought the Palestinian problem to the fore, blaming U.S. support of Israel for the
attacks on the Palestinians in the occupied territories. During a meeting of the PLO
Executive Committee the following month, Saddam Hussein was praised for his initiative
to increase financial support to the intifada, and hailed for "...sisterly Iraq's policy of
placing the issue of the Palestinian people and support for their struggle at the top of its
priorities."192
The known military power of Saddam Hussein's Iraqi forces, coupled with his ability
to make chemical weapons and threats to use them against Israel, made him almost a folk
hero among Palestinians. After the U.S.-PLO dialogue ended in June, the Palestinians
were in need of a partner to assist with their single handed fight against the U.S. supported
Israeli aggression. As the intifada continued into its third year, despair prevailed as the
establishment of a Palestinian state seemed as far from reality as ever. Saddam Hussein, a
longtime friend of the Palestinians and leader of the most powerful Arab nation, brought
the Palestinian problem back to the fore and became an overnight hero in the occupied
191 Baghdad, INA in Arabic, January 24, 1988, as translated in FBIS-NES, January 25, 1988, p. 8 .
192Baghdad, Voice of the PLO in Arabic, June 7, 1990, as translated in FBIS-NES, June 8, 1990, p.
12.
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territories. In an interview published in Le Nouvel Observateur, Fatah Central Committee
member, Aby Iyad explained the phenomena: "The support is due not to geographical
proximity or adherence to any principle or ideology, but above all to an identification with
watchwords that now express the Palestinians' despair in the absence of a political
solution." 19 3
The initial PLO response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was to support Hussein. The
inconsistency of supporting the occupation of Kuwait, while simultaneously condemning
Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, combined with the strong backlash from
Gulf powers however, had Arafat backpedaling to change his image to crisis mediator vice
unconditional Hussein supporter. In a statement issued by the PLO following an
emergency meeting to discuss the Gulf crisis, the organization's leadership emphasized its
mediator role in the crisis:
Throughout the crisis, the PLO has been working in accordance with the principle of
preserving the higher Arab interests and solidarity and seeking an honorable solution
that preserves the dignity and rights of all. It did not seek a solution in favor of one
party at the expense of another, but rather a solution that safeguards the security and
safety of Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, and the entire Arab region. 194
Although Arafat has attempted to play go-between in negotiating a settlement, there is no
doubt that Hussein's linkage of an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait with an Israeli
withdrawal from the occupied territories, has further incited the support of the Palestinian
masses and therefo:e necessitated that Arafat continue his support for Hussein, whether or
not a diplomatic solution appears possible. Direct U.S. involvement in the Gulf further
19 3 Paris, Le Nouvel Observateur in French September 27-October 3, 1990, p. 45, as translated in FBIS-
NES, November 1, 1990, p. 3.
194Sanaa, Voice of Palestine in Arabic, August 20, 1990, as translated in FBIS-NES, August 21, 1990,
p. 2.
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cemented Palestinian support for Hussein who now represented the monster capable of
devouring the imperialist western giant.
In a statement issued by PLO Executive Committee member Juwayd al-Ghusayn, the
PLO's position on Iraq's occupation of Kuwait was clarified. "...the support of the PLO
for Iraq's pan-Arab and national positions does not absolutely mean supporting Iraq in
occupying and annexing Kuwait by force, affirming that this is an illegal measure. ' 195
Reiterating the PLC's disagreement with the Iraqi move, without directly condemning Iraq,
he stated: "Frankly, we support Kuwaiti legitimacy and we stand against any occupation of
Kuwait or elsewhere."' 96 Such a statement by a virtual unknown in the PLO ranks,
demonstrates the difficult position of the PLO. Support for Hussein implies approval of
his actions, however, approval of the hostile invasion was more hypocrisy then the PLO
could stand. Allowing low level PLO members to proclaim the "real" policy of the PLO
might ease criticism by the Gulf states without upsetting Saddam or the Palestinian people
who support him. What the PLO is really saying is: "We approve of you as the leader of
pan-Arabism and the supporter of the Palestinian cause, Saddam, but we do not approve of
your occupation of Kuwait."
In November of 1990, Abu Iyad, Arafat's right hand man, clearly stated the PLO's
opposition to the occupation and annexation of Kuwait and explained the reason why the
PLO did not condemn Iraq.
No party can presume to perform such a role if it has already condemned the country
with which it intends to intercede. The absence of a condemnation is connected with
our desire to mediate. 197
195Riyadh, SPA, August 19, 1990, as translated in FBIS-NES, August 20, 1990, p. 2.
19 6 Riyadh, SPA, August 19, 1990, p. 3.
197paris, Le Nouvel Observateur in French, September 27-October 3, 1990, p. 45, as translated in
FBIS-NES, November 1, 1990, p. 2.
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Such a statement provides a plausible reason for the PLO's support of Hussein and is
obviously written more for the Western media than the local Palestinians. A problem with
the mediator logic arises however, when one realizes Arafat's lack of international
legitimacy in playing such a role. Neither the Western powers nor the Gulf states accept
Arafat as the peacemaker in the Gulf crisis.
Internal support for Iraq was evident in the UNLU's declaration of support for the
PLO stand and their call for the Arab people "...to support fraternal Iraq and to extend all
means of material and moral support to it in its confrontation of this aggression." 198 In a
broadcast to the Arab countries, the UNLU called on Syria to withdraw its forces from
Saudi Arabia and instead direct them against the "Zionist Enemy" and condemned Egypt
and Morocco for "...their standing on the side of imperialism and Zionism by sending
armies to help U.S. aggressiveness .... 199 The lack of condemnation of Syria probably
stems from the fact that the PFLP and DFLP are both based in Damascus. Despite their
past allegiance to al-Assad, both leaders have supported the PLO in backing Saddam. The
internal leaders of the UNLU want Syria to join in fighting western forces but do not want
to alienate al-Assad in the process. The Islamic factions have also united with the PLO in
supporting Hussein, the man standing up to the "American devil." 2°°
Although the Gulf Crisis may have helped unite Palestinian leadership factions (even
Jibril supports the PLO position), Arafat's support for Hussein has not been without its
costs. The invasion itself has created a large number of homeless Palestinians who
19 8Baghdad, Voice of the PLO in Arabic, August 19, 1990, as translated in FBIS-NES, August 21,
1990, p. 4.
199 Algiers, Voice of Palestine in Arabic, September 18, 1990, as translated in FBIS-NES, September
19, 1990, p. 2.
200Daoud Kuttab, "Occupied Palestine: Emotions Take Over," in Middle East International, (August 31,
1990), p. 14.
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previously worked in Kuwait and put an end to Kuwait's support of many Palestinian
institutions. Although it is difficult to tell whether or not the Gulf states have ended their
financial support to the territories (there are conflicting reports on whether or not the Gulf
states continue to support the Palestinians in the territories), there is no doubt that Arafat
has been ostracized by the Gulf countries. The Jerusalem Post received information from
Arab diplomatic sources that officials from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain and the
Kuwaiti government-in-exile have all "...declared the PLO chairman persona non
grata." 20 1 Aside from his relations with Arab countries, Arafat has lost the support of the
Peace Camp within Israel that had previously attempted to pressure the Israeli government
into negotiating with the PLO. Siding with Saddam has destroyed Arafat's credibility as a
moderate. Saddam's threats to use chemical weapons on Israel if attacked is too
reminiscent to the Israelis, of the original PLO charter calling for the destruction of Israel.
Support for Iraq has foiled attempts to reestablish the U.S.-PLO dialogue, once
considered the best route to a peaceful solution with Israel. Arafat and the PLO thus appear
to have taken a step backwards away from conciliation and towards confrontation. Such a
position has damaged Arafat's carefully sculptured international image and repair may be
impossible. According to Ambassador Robert Neumann, Director of Middle East Studies,
Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, Arafat made a "very big
mistake" and must turn away from Hussein if the PLO is to recover. 20 2 Arafat's position
would be in jeopardy however, if such a maneuver were undertaken without the support of
the Palestinians in the territories.
20 Jerusalem, The Jerusalem Post, August 16, 1990, p. 1, as translated in FBIS-NES, August 17,
1990, p. 1.
202Author's interview on September 26, 1990.
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B. A NEW PHASE IN THE UPRISING?
On October 8, 1990, 19 Palestinians were killed in a clash that began with Israeli
worshipers and ended with armed Israeli policemen. The Palestinian problem that had been
greatly overshadowed by the gulf crisis was once again front page news as the killing
incited violent protests not unlike those seen at the start of the intifada in 1987. The new
inflammation of riotous activities in the territories allowed Arafat, at least for a while, to
return to his more comfortable position as leader of the Palestinians.
The response of Palestinians in the territories has been to escalate violence against the
•-aelis. In a radio broadcast on the day of the killings, the UNLU "...declar[ed] every
soldier-settler on the land of Palestine a target that should be liquidated.' '203 Unlike
previous broadcasts, this one failed to mention the PLO by name, possibly indicating a lack
of PLO approval prior to release. Although the PLO has threatened many times to
authorize armed violence in the territories, there is no indication that such approval was
given. After a West Bank resident killed three Israelis on October 21st however, The New
York Times reported that leaflets issued by the PLO and the fundamentalist Muslim
leadership called on Arabs "...to seek revenge for the slaying at Al Aksa."2° 4 Although the
leaflet does not explicitly call for armed attacks, it is the first time the PLO has called for
revenge for a specific act.
A sign of changing times is evident in the territories with the increased frequency of
armed attacks on Israeli citizens. Two Weeks after the Israeli killings, a West Bank
Palestinian stabbed and killed three Israelis. He was hailed as a hero by fellow Palestinians
203Algiers, Voice of Palestine in Arabic, October 9, 1990, as translated in FBIS-NES, October 11,
1990, p. 2.
204Sabra Chartrand, "Palestinian Stabs 3 Israelis Dead; Revenge for Mosque Melee is Seen," in The
New York Times, (October 22, 1990), p. A7.
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and his "success" inspired further acts of violence. Hamas leaders, in praising the killings
stated:
We bless the hero who killed with his knife three soldiers from the enemy in
Jerusalem. This is only the beginning. 20 5
Thus, the latest round of violence in the territories has inspired violence beyond that
previously known to the intifada. Although most acts still appear to be isolated incidents
perpetrated by lone individuals, continued calls for violence from the UNLU and Hamas
will no doubt inspire larger scale action in the future. It is presently unclear if indeed the
PLO has control over events in the territories, but continuing escalation of violence will no
doubt further damage the ailing PLO image.
205Sabra Chartrand, "Assassin or Muslim Avenger, A West Bank Hero," in The New York Times,
October 24, 1990, p. A7.
89
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The Palestinian Liberation Organization has been the symbol of Palestinian nationalism
almost from its inception. It was the early fedayeen attacks on Israeli targets that first gave
the Palestinian people a chance to hope that perhaps their battle against occupation could be
won. The PLO is the one symbol that unifies the majority of the Palestinians in the West
Bank and Gaza and it is through the PLO that the Palestinian people have developed a
Palestinian identity. Whether or not the people of the territories agree with the political
tactics of Arafat, he is the symbol of the PLO and the symbol of Palestinian pride and
nationalism. Such decr roots and strong affiliation are not easily dismissed or challenged.
Of the groups discussed however, there are several who are rivaling the PLO's authority
and who threaten to upset the status quo in the territories.
The rise of the intifada injected the West Bank and Gaza Palesti-iians with a renewed
sense of pride and hope that through organization and unity, the dream of a Palestinian state
could be realized. This new sense of self-confidence promoted the development of
internally supported political groups. As the primary force representing the internal PLO
factions, the UNLU chose (or was perhaps coerced), to accept the external PLO as the
ultimate authority in directing the intifada. Although the PLO is responsible for setting
broad political strategy, the internal organization was not content to exist as a non-political
force that merely enforced PLO policy. According to Ambassador Robert Neumann, the
internal leadership is very independent, but it chooses to use the PLO as its political
representative. 20 6 The new internal leadership had a political agenda of its own that could
not be ignored by the external leadership. The youth of the territory were prepared to die in
20 6 Aithors interview on September 26, 1990.
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the struggle to end the Israeli occupation. Their views therefore, had to be a consideration
in determining what course the intifada would follow and what political concessions would
be made to move the peace process forward. The decision of the 19th PNC was one
example of the rising influence of the territories' internal leadership.
The majority of Palestinians still claim the PLO as their legitimate representative, but as
the intifada continues and no progress is made, internal challenges to the PLO's previously
unquestioned authority are coming from several directions. An article printed in late 1989
declared: "Palestinians under occupation are growing weary - and indeed angry - with the
apparent prevarication of the external Icadership." 207 The moderates within the territories
who supported the PLO's recognition of Israel and acceptance of UN resolutions 242 and
338, are quickly losing their legitimacy. Israel's continued treatment of Palestinians as
second class citizens with little or no legal rights and the continuing use of armed violence
to control riots has also contributed to an increase in radicalization of the population.
Author Emile Sahliveh considers the continuing occupation to be a direct cause for the rise
of radicalism in the territories.
Continuation of Israel's military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip will
reinforce the position of extremist groups and proponents of radical ideologies. West
Bank leaders can hardly maintain a moderate and a pragmatic stance without concrete
evidence of Israel's flexibility and political liberalization.20 8
Israel has thus found itself in a dangerous spiral with the Palestinian people. The people of
the territories, angry at the continuing occupation, incite the soldiers through stone
throwing attacks and the soldiers respond with gunfire, causing an increase in tension and a
call for revenge.
20 7
"The Price of No Solution," in The Middle East, (November, 1989), p. 14.
2 0 8Sahliy~h, p. 179.
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The most recent rash of armed violence by Palestinians against Israeli citizens is one
indication of increasing radicalism in the territories and represents a lack of control over
events by the external and even possibly the internal leadership. Although it is difficult to
determine at this early stage whether or not the current violence perpetrated by individual
Palestinians is connected to any greater movement, it appears the radical elements are
gaining the upper hand through their promotion of increased violence in the territories.
Of the groups studied, the only ones capable of eventually rivaling the PLO for control
in the territories, are the shock committees and Hamas. Of these two groups, neither
appears to have a strong charismatic leader who could vie for Arafat's position as leader of
the Palestinians. Israel's policy of arresting and deporting any known leaders within the
territories is perhaps partly to blame for the failure of either group to produce a strong
leader. "Ihe elaborate intelligence network of the Israeli government is capable of
decapitating any potential leadership even before it actually ,-omes to power. Although the
shock committees are not a separate politica! entity with a mass fcilowing in the territories,
their strong organizational structure and militancy ceuld fuel increased acts of violence.
Hamas, on the other hand, has a political agenda and a moderate following in the
territories. While neither group presents a direct leadership challenge to the PLO's
authority, their growing popularity will result in an increase in political clout. Thus,
although there may not be an alternative internal leadership capable of vying for the top
leadership position, thcre are internal groups with enough popular support to render them
capable of influencing the policy decisions of the PLO. PLO policies that were once
influenced by the politics of moderates, will become increasingly subjected to the
influences of these radical internal forces and will be forced to follow the changing political
mainstream or risk losing popular support. The moderates in the territories, according to
Dr. Erika Alin of the National Council on U.S.-Arab relations, feel a sense of urgency to
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have the peace process move forward. They have waited two years since their people
accepted Israel and as a result, have noted an increase in radicalization. 2° 9
The primary force affecting Palestinian politics at the present, is the Gulf Crisis. The
express support for Saddam Hussein has been a large gamble for the Palestinians, but with
no other options available, it had to be taken. They have already suffered a loss of support
from Arab countries and a loss of international sympathy for the Palestinian cause. If
Saddam loses in the face of Western aggression, hope for an Arab solution to the
Palestinian problem will once again be lost. Saddam's loss would undoubtedly bring an
increase in support for &he Islamic movements. As often hanpens when in the depths of
despair, man reaches for religion. As Dr. Erika Alin stated, Saddam's loss would be "a
loss for secularism as opposed to fundamentalism. '" 210 If on the other hand, Saddam is
perceived as having won the fight against imperialism, his radical ideologies may serve to
speed the process of radicalization in the territories. Either way, the moderates lose.
The PLO of 1988 is not the PLO of 1990 and as violence in the territories increases,
the PLO of the future will no doubt have a greater following among radical factions. Israel,
therefore, by refusing to talk to the PLO, may have missed the opportunity to negotiate
with the Palestinian leadership at its most moderate position. If Hamas continues to gain
influence, the end result may be adherence to the goal of a Palestinian state in all of historic
Palestine. As author Graham Fuller stated in The West Bank of Israel. Point of No
Return?, the emerging leadership in the territories could "...come one day to constitute that
'independent leadership' on the West Bank that the Israelis claim they have been looking
209Author's interview on September 24, 1990.
2 10 Author's interview on September 24, 1990.
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for all along - except that it will never present the malleability that Israel had been hoping
for and it will not settle for what Israel proposes to offer." 211
2 1 1 Fuller, p. 13.
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